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The Detainees' Dilemma:
The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy
Strategies in the War on Terror
PETER MARGULIESt
INTRODUCTION

For detainees in the war on terror, advocacy outside of
court is often the main event.' Analysis of advocacy through
the prism of Supreme Court decisions 2 resembles surveying
t Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; e-mail:
pmargulies@rwu.edu. I thank Muneer Ahmad, Jerry Cohen, Mark Denbeaux,
Steve Ellmann, Jonathan Freiman, Steve Gillers, Bruce Green, Joe Margulies,
Frank Munger, Martha Rayner, Dan Richman, Ellen Saideman, Bill Simon,
Paul Tremblay, Ian Weinstein, Rick Wilson, and participants at the Clinical
Theory Workshop at New York Law School for comments on a previous draft.
This paper flows from the profound admiration and respect I feel for all the
lawyers who represent detainees at Guantanamo-they embody the highest
ideals of the American legal profession. Needless to say, all the flaws in this
paper are my own.
1. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public
Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 (2008) (discussing "alternative lawyering" that
takes place largely outside the courtroom, or where litigation complements
rather than dominates the overall social justice agenda); Stephen Ellmann,
Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 349, 359 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (same); David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in
Guantdnamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2014-16 (2008) (discussing representation
of ex-Guantanamo detainee David Hicks by Major Michael "Dan" Mori);
Catherine Powell, The Role of TransnationalNorm Entrepreneurs in the U.S.
"War on Terrorism," 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47 (2004) (discussing role of
international human rights organizations).
2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (striking down provisions
of Military Commissions Act that purported to limit federal courts' jurisdiction
over writs of habeas corpus brought by detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that President Bush had exceeded his authority in
unilaterally establishing military commissions); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) (holding that statutory writ of habeas corpus extended to Guantanamo);
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an iceberg based on what appears above the surface: the
analyst will not understand the actual dimensions of the
issue. To better assess the virtues and risks of lawyering for
human rights, one must consider mobilization strategies
devised by lawyers outside appellate courts' exalted realm. I
call mobilization of this kind "crossover advocacy."
Crossover advocacy encompasses a vast repertoire,
including advocacy with the media, foreign governments
and their constituents, and international forums such as the
United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. 3 Crossover advocacy also includes4
scholarship by academic lawyers working for detainees,
and damage suits against officials or entities after a
detainee's release. 5 In the fluid world of 'law in action," 6
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (ruling that Congress' passage of the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution after September
11, 2001, allowed the executive to detain presumptive U citizen apprehended in
Afghanistan subject to due process safeguards); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over habeas
petition challenging detention of terror suspect where petition had not been filed
in district of suspect's immediate custodian).
3. See, e.g., Letter from Santiago A. Canton, Executive Secretary, Inter-Am.
Comm'n on Human Rights, to Org. of Am. States (Aug. 20, 2008),
http://ccrjustice.org/files/08.08.20LIACHR-precautionary/o2Omeasures%20(2).pdf
(requesting the U.S. government take measures to ensure that detainee is not
subjected to abusive interrogation, or returned to Algeria, where he may face
torture, and receives adequate medical care); cf. Cummings, supra note 1, at
1013 (noting range of venues in which advocates have appeared).
4. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfel&" The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice,120 HARv. L. REV. 65 (2006); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance
in the "War on Terror," 108 COLuM. L. REV. 1013 (2008). For other important
analyses of issues of lawyering, politics, and legal doctrine by academic
advocates for detainees, see JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO
THE WINDWARD SIDE (2007); Muneer I. Ahmad, Guantdnamo is Here: The
Military CommissionsAct and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1

(2007); Mark Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client
Relationship in GuantanamoBay, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 491 (2007); Jonathan
Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, JudicialReview, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at
Guantdnamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 127 (2006); Martha Rayner,
Roadblocks to Effective Representation of Uncharged, Indefinitely Imprisoned
Clients at GuantdnamoBay Military Base, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 485 (2007).
5. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying relief); see also
Complaint, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/YooComplaint.pdf [hereinafter Padilla Complaint];
cf. James Barron, U.S. Appeals Court to Rehear Case of Deported Canadian,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at B4 (reporting that Second Circuit will rehear case
en banc). I include damage suits brought on behalf of detainees because they
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crossover advocacy has played a more conspicuous role than
the elite briefing and argument that inspires Supreme
Court opinions.
Necessity drives much crossover advocacy. The Bush
administration's buffeting of rule of law values 7 has left
often are elements of a broader mobilization campaign in which success in court
is doubtful, if not irrelevant. Scott Cummings calls this approach "tactical
pluralism." See Cummings, supra note 1, at 897, 1013-15; Scott L. Cummings,
Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the
Inglewood Site Fight,95 CAL. L. REV. 1927, 1932, 1979-91 (2007).
6. See Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public
Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1619, 1622 n.11 (2007)
(citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910)). See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY:
PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1997) (contrasting conception of legal
practices with legal doctrine).
7. Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought on the Bush
administration's measures in the war on terror, although as with any typology
one could argue that there are more intra- than inter-group differences. One
group of commentators argues for deference to presidential decisionmaking. See
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 275 (2007) (arguing that legal constraints on national
security decision-making are usually counterproductive and institutionally
flawed); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047, 2101-02 (2005) (generally
calling for judicial deference to executive decisions). Another group vigorously
opposes most claims of presidential power, and stresses the roles of both Court
and Congress. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (arguing for robust constraints on
presidential authority); Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
2085 (2005) (same); cf. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander
in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941
(2008) (offering defense of heightened role for Congress and the courts, while
conceding that presidents including Lincoln and Roosevelt have sometimes been
wise to act unilaterally, at least where their actions were publicly disclosed and
subject to subsequent legislative ratification). A third group seeks a middle way,
calling for robust procedural safeguards but also acknowledging the need for
flexibility within the political branches. See OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NI
AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
123-27 (2006) (arguing that the President may act unilaterally but must mark
such actions as outside the legal system and submit actions for ex post facto
ratification); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence
of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008)
(arguing that criminal and military models increasingly share common ground
illustrated by the military model's move toward heightened procedural
protections and criminal law's increasing use of amorphous substantive
standards in conspiracy and related offenses); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An
Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION
IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 161 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005)
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lawyers with lemons, and the lawyers have responded by
making lemonade. Viewed in this light, crossover advocacy
is a resourceful adaptation to exigent circumstances.
However, crossover advocacy also shares characteristics
with other examples of legal change.
Scholars have frequently noticed that restrictions in one
area of law or legal practice have consequences familiar to
those who have played the game of "whack-a-mole."
Problems that the regulator has hoped to tamp down keep
reappearing from another direction. Legal restrictions
rarely succeed at shutting off all exits; instead, players
restricted in one realm can often cross over into another,
recreating the incursion that the restrictions sought to
curb. 8 For example, tort reform measures that have limited
punitive damages often correlate with an increase in jury
awards of compensatory damages. 9 Similar dynamics occur
in administrative,1o international,11 constitutional,12 and
criminal law.13
(arguing for deference to the President when Congress concurs); Peter
Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight" Exigency, Institutional
Equity, and ProcedureAfter September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004) (arguing
that the President should have authority to detain that is subject to due process
and tailored to threats). Goldsmith's presence in the first and third categories
demonstrates both the fuzziness at the margins and the fluidity of the law in
this area.
8. A path-breaking variant of this theme from the law and economics
literature is the Coase Theorem, which posits that parties subject to certain
legal restrictions will-assuming low transaction costs-contract their way
around those legal rules. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 4-5
(Yale Law Sch., Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=959177.
9. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical
Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 429-37 (2005) (discussing
"crossover effect").
10. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 552-55 (2006) (arguing that judicial
decisions that link deference to agency with degree of formality of
administrative procedures may create unintended consequences, including
agency policy positions in cases involving formal rulemaking that test limits of
statutory text).
11. See Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies". Remedial
Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 710-30 (2008)
(discussing inflexible remedial rules that require complete relief once court finds
violations of human rights lead tribunals to heighten procedural obstacles, such
as harmless error rule).
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However, this crossover effect is not an unalloyed good.
Even when crossover effects allow advocates to resist
negative
they
also create
misguided restrictions,
externalities. For example, lawyers seeking higher damage
awards under a regime that caps noneconomic damages
may be more likely to bring cases with clearly provable
economic damages, thereby screening out cases involving
disadvantaged groups who cannot show high earnings
potential. 14 Since lawyers' case selection decisions are
largely unreviewable, the crossover effect here harms a
cohort of prospective clients with meritorious claims.
This Article argues that crossover advocacy in the war
on terror triggers a comparable dilemma. 15 On the one hand,
crossover advocacy has notable virtues. For example, it has
enhanced the voices of detainees who without the lawyers
would suffer in silence from indefinite detention and the
legacy of coercive interrogation techniques. Crossover
advocacy has also provided a crucial counterweight to the
Bush administration's narrative depicting detainees as the
12. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884-85 (1999) (arguing that over time
courts will define rights such as right to nondiscriminatory public education or
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment to avoid entangling themselves in
unmanageable remedial regimes).
13. See Daniel Richman, DecisionsAbout Coercion: The CorporateAttorneyClient Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 317 (2008) (noting
trade-offs in criminal law and procedure between heightened procedural
protections that provide defendants with leverage and broader criminal
prohibitions that tend to dissipate that leverage); William J. Stuntz, The
PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, The Pathological] (arguing that adoption of exclusionary rule barring
fruit of coercive interrogation prompted legislatures to revise criminal laws to
target offenses like drug possession that were easy to prove without the need for
a defendant's statements); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and FourthAmendment
Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 917-18 (1991) (arguing exclusionary rule alters
constituency for warrants among law enforcement players, thereby altering law
enforcement policies).
14. See Sharkey, supranote 9, at 489-90.
15. For a parallel argument on the overlapping risks of litigation and
mobilization strategies, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism:
Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARv. L. REV.
937, 971-80 (2007). Cf. Robert 0. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic
Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations,3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 477 (2002)
(acknowledging that international mobilization campaigns also often are
dominated by elite constituencies, and can hurt the interests of subordinated
people with different priorities, such as indigenous people injured by
Greenpeace's campaign against sealing).
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"worst of the worst."16 More concretely, while the Bush
administration apparently conceived of Guantanamo as a
law-free zone that would facilitate the incapacitation and
interrogation of suspected terrorists, crossover advocacy has
helped spur detainees' release.17 Crossover advocacy has
built
coalitions
between
progressive
lawyering
organizations such as the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) and mainstream law firms.1S Indeed, concern for the
rule of law in handling detainee cases has extended beyond
the legal realm to the domain of politics.19 Nevertheless, as
of early 2009, the government continues to detain
individuals who pose no danger to the United States. Blame
for this injustice should fall heavily on the shoulders of the
Bush administration. However, the persistence of injustice
also prompts questions about the efficacy of crossover
advocacy.20 Seeking answers to those questions is the
principal focus of this Article.
Asking the right questions reveals that crossover
advocacy has risks as well as virtues. Crossovers spawn
opportunity costs and unintended consequences. Moreover,
because of cognitive flaws, crossover advocates may fail to
16. Dahlia Lithwick, The Imperial Presidency, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007,
at B2 (quoting former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
17. Traditional legal advocacy has also played a significant role. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); see also Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d
834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that government had not provided sufficient
evidence in hearing below to justify continued detention of petitioner, an ethnic
Uighur who fled persecution in his native China).
18. See Brendan M. Driscoll, Note, The Guantanamo Protective Order, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873, 887-88 n.64 (2007) (noting efforts by Center for
Constitional Rights (CCR) to recruit pro bono counsel for detainees, including
attorneys from major law firms).
19. Barack Obama, for example, incorporated into his stump speech a
commitment to both close Guantanamo and ensure adequate judicial review of
detainee claims for release. See Barack Obama, Rally at Rhode Island College,
Mar. 1, 2008; see also Protecting Our Liberty, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 28,
2008, at 8A (noting that President Obama has urged the closing of Guantanamo
during campaign).
20. For more pragmatic conceptions of public interest law that seek to
avoid this quandary, see William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
127, 170-81 (2004) (outlining more flexible approaches to defining community
interests). Cf. Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing
Times: Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective
Structural Change?, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 323, 325-30 (2007) (describing
more collaborative models of advocacy).
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appreciate these pitfalls. Crossover advocates, like other
human beings, labor under a temporal discounting deficit.
This flaw encourages individuals to unduly discount long21
term costs, and inflate the value of short-term benefits.
Second, crossover advocates share with other human beings
a self-serving bias. 22 This flaw encourages an asymmetric
attribution of responsibility for problems to others. As a
result of these biases, crossover advocates fail to grapple
with three issues: asymmetries in accountability between
traditional and crossover forums, conflicts of interest and
role, and negative externalities that affect the public and
undermine crossover advocates' causes.
First, consider asymmetric levels of accountability in
crossover forums when compared with traditional judicial
forums. At first blush, lower levels of accountability for
advocates in crossover forums such as the media and
international tribunals may seem liberating. However,
lower levels of accountability in crossover forums can lead to
undisciplined advocacy, opportunity costs for clients, and an
echo-chamber effect in which preaching to the converted
prevails. For example, crossover advocacy that uncritically
pitches stories of innocence or detainee abuse can
undermine the credibility of the advocate. 23 Moreover, the
lure of crossover advocacy in exotic forums can detract from

21. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (noting tendency to inappropriately discount future costs); David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445 (1997)
(arguing that individuals use "commitment mechanisms" such as insurance
policies or savings plans to compensate for tendency to unduly discount the
future); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in PredictingFuture Utility,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1209 (2003) (analyzing flaws in discounting over time).
22. For discussions of self-serving bias and egocentricism in cognitive
processing, see Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); Boaz
Keysar & Dale J. Barr, Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do

Not Do What They "Should," in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 150, 152-56 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Emily
Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra,at 636, 641-46.

Psychological

23. See Al-Ghizzawi v. Bush, No. 05-2378, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27988, at
*4 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2008) (rebuking attorney for detainee).
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traditional strategies that often benefit clients, such 24as
persuading a detainee to cooperate with the government.
Second, conflicts of interest and roles can similarly
impede deliberation and injure clients. An advocate seeking
to highlight legitimate concerns about false positives among
detainees may be tempted to issue an empirical study of the
detainee population.25 However, the advocate's stake in the
matter may result in a study that fudges results. Similarly,
academic advocates for detainees may take litigation
stances that cast prior scholarly positions as arguments of
convenience, or may decline to recognize litigation realities
because of loyalty to pet theories. Academic lawyers anxious
to highlight the Bush administration's abundant faults may
also turn litigation into a vindictive venture that obscures
more than it enlightens. As an example, consider the
amorphous complaint drafted by the Yale National
Litigation Project in a recent lawsuit against John Yoo.26
The complaint, which archly asks for a dollar in damages
for the Yale Project's clients, seeks to both score rhetorical
points and secure justice. Sadly, it falls between two stools,
24. On cooperation generally, see Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing cooperation), Michael A. Simons,
Retributionfor Rats: Cooperation,Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1, 33-42 (2003) [hereinafter Simons, Retribution for Rats] (asserting that
cooperation can be a form of atonement, not merely a product of utilitarian
calculus), Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and
"Good Corporate Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 992-95 (2002)
[hereinafter Simons, Vicarious Snitching] (analyzing cooperation of corporations
as strategy for avoiding indictment), Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 614 (1999) (describing dynamics of cooperation,
based on sentencing decisions of judges and other factors). Cf. Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with FederalProsecutors:Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 955, 959 (1999) (noting pattern of
embellishment and outright misrepresentation among cooperators).
25. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO
DETANEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DATA (2006), httpJ/law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final-2-08-06.pdf
[hereinafter DETAINEE STUDY].

26. Yoo, a Berkeley law professor, formerly served as an attorney at the
Justice Department's elite Office of Legal Counsel, where he authored the
justifiably infamous "torture memos." See Padilla Complaint, supra note 5, at 3;

Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in The

TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA

236, 237-38 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); David Luban, The Torture Lawyers
of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176-80, 200-02 (2007);
Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the
Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separationof Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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by ignoring commitments to concreteness and consistency at
the heart of the rule of law.
Third, crossover advocacy sometimes disregards the
dynamic process of law reform, which yields externalities
that can injure the public and advocates' allies. For
example, unlimited expansion of aiding and abetting
liability may boomerang, making it easier to target
government lawyers like Yoo who provided outrageously
poor legal advice, but also chilling prospective donors to
international charities anxious about being sued for aiding
terrorism. An adversary may also be able to exit a realm
where the crossover advocate has inspired new regulation,
and migrate to a domain less responsive to advocacy efforts.
For example, critics of the Bush administration who urge
the closure of Guantanamo may be in for a shock if the
government responds by ramping up rendition, placing
suspected
terrorists
in
the custody
of friendly
governments, 27 or seeks to use bases more remote than
Guantanamo for interrogation and detention. Finally,
crossover advocates fail to reckon adequately with the
possibility of backlash. Advocates' mobilization efforts may
be most successful in mobilizing opponents. For example,
advocates' invocation of international law can trigger a
political dynamic that28 spurs Congress to modify
international obligations.
To promote deliberation, this Article suggests a
mobilization metric for crossover advocacy. This metric has
three premises. First, legal change, including the change
wrought by lawyers' adversaries, is endogenous to crossover
advocacy. Therefore, crossover advocates must accept
responsibility for such change, whether or not they intended
it to occur. If mobilization efforts fade, falter, or boomerang
through operation of the law of unintended consequences,
crossover advocacy has not lived up to its billing. Second,
cognitive biases such as the temporal discounting deficit are
ubiquitous. To neutralize their effect, crossover advocates
must expressly take into account the long-term costs of
mobilization efforts. Third, the effectiveness of a given
crossover forum or tactic varies at different points in the
27. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333 (2007).
28. Congress has this authority under the Constitution. See Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (discussing "last in time" rule).
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trajectory of legal change. Some tactics outlive their
usefulness, requiring that the advocate revise her repertoire
continually to keep pace with legal change.
With these premises in mind, the mobilization metric
first considers three factors: the probability (P) of the
innocence of the detainee; the treatment (T) of the detainee,
focusing on the risk of unfair procedures; and the gravity
(G) of the maximum sentence or harm that could be
imposed. The metric weighs the value of this expression
against the sum of two variables: opportunity costs (0) and
the ease of an adversary's exit (E) from the sought-after
reforms. When P(T + G) > 0 + E, a mobilization tactic is
appropriate.
Like any model of the complexities of the behavior of
legal actors, the mobilization metric is not a mechanical
tool. Providing a numerical value for the variables in the
metric is a function of craft and judgment, not science.
However, deliberating about the content of each variable
will enhance the advocate's ability to effectively represent
clients in the many challenging forums outside of court.
The approach taken in this Article is new. While
scholars have discussed what I call crossover advocacy in
the detainee context, 29 no scholar writing about law and
terrorism has systematically analyzed the risks and benefits
of this approach to lawyering. Nor has scholarship assessed
advocacy in nontraditional forums through the lens of
crossover effects that also appear in tort, criminal,
constitutional, and administrative law. Moreover, no
scholar has modeled the variables that determine crossover
advocacy's effectiveness. My hope is that the analysis in the
Article will inform the efforts of both scholars and advocates
to refine the advocate's role.
The Article is in six parts. Part I traces the evolution of
lawyering and mobilization from Josiah Quincy II's defense
of British soldiers accused in the Boston Massacre to the
present, and outlines the challenges to conventional
lawyering posed by the detention of suspected terrorists at
Guantanamo. Part II first discusses crossover effects in
torts, and then describes the repertoire of crossover
advocacy, including contacts with the media and work with
29. See Cummings, supra note 1, at 1013; Katyal, supra note 4; Luban,
supra note 1, at 2014-16; Martinez, supra note 4, at 1069-70.
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other governments and transnational bodies. After a
discussion of the virtues of crossover advocacy, including
maximizing client voice, it turns to a general view of
potential pitfalls, stemming from the temporal discounting
deficit and self-serving bias. Part III traces risks to candor
and costs for clients stemming from asymmetrical
accountability in traditional advocacy and crossover venues.
Part LV analyzes conflicts of interest and role, focusing on
problems that arise when academics become detainee
advocates, for example in the Yale Project's lawsuit against
John Yoo. Part V discusses externalities that affect
advocates' allies and the public through boomerang effects,
exit, and backlash. Finally, Part VI explores core premises
that should guide crossover advocates, including the
endogeneity of changes to lawyers' mobilization efforts, the
ubiquity of cognitive biases, and the need for strategic
pivots to exploit legal transitions. To refine ex ante analysis
of these risks, this Part sets out a mobilization metric and
applies the metric to examples from the post-September 11
legal environment.
I. UNCONVENTIONAL ADVOCACY IN PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW AND THE CHALLENGE OF GUANTANAMO

Advocacy to stop abuses at Guantanamo has emerged
from a long-time dynamic in criminal defense and public
interest law. One persistent strand of criminal defense
strategy has sought to ignite public indignation over a
purportedly unjust prosecution. In addition, public interest
law has oscillated between a mode that favored elite
litigation and a more eclectic mode that included
organizing, deal-making, media relations, and political
change.30
30. For critiques of elite litigation as an exclusive strategy for enhancing
empowerment, see GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S
VIEW OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1989), Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice:Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107
(1991), Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering and the Pragmatist
Dilemma, in

RENASCENT PRAGMATISM: STUDIES IN LAw AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 220

(Alfonso Morales ed., Ashgate Press 2003), Peter Margulies, The Mother with
Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected. A Civic Republican View of
Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (1994), Lucie E.
White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-1988) [hereinafter White,
Mobilization], and Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from
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A. Alternative Advocacy Strategies:An American History
Criminal defense lawyers have long wrestled with the
balance between advocacy in and out of court in
representing unpopular clients. 31 John Adams and his fellow
patriot Josiah Quincy II represented the most unpopular
defendants in colonial Massachusetts: the British soldiers
accused of responsibility for the so-called "Boston
Massacre." 32 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the
legendary defense attorney Clarence Darrow used the
media to dramatize the mistreatment of labor activists
accused of crimes. 33 In the 1920s, the accused murderers
Sacco and Vanzetti, whom many believed were targeted
because of their anarchist sympathies, inspired a vigorous if
ultimately unsuccessful press campaign to assert their
innocence. Then-law-professor Felix Frankfurter not only
wrote legal briefs for the two men, but also published
articles and made speeches to assist their cause.3 4
The use of community mobilization to complement
courtroom advocacy has continued to the present day. In the
1960s, radical lawyers like William Kunstler used trials as
engines for publicity, seeking to demonstrate the
illegitimacy of the system. 35 In addition, death penalty
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699 [hereinafter White,
To Learn and Teach]. Community economic development advocacy, because it is
often transactional in nature, has developed a particularly rich literature on
mobilization. See Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance
Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879, 1905-06 (2007).
31. See generally Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and
InternationalLaw, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 115-17 (2005) (discussing political defenses
in trials of dissenters, extremists, and defendants accused of sedition).
32. See PORTRAIT OF A PATRIOT: THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PAPERS OF
JOSIAH QUINCY JUNIOR 7, 21-27 (Daniel R. Coquillette & Neil Longley York eds.,
2005).

33.
34.

See CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 180 (1996).
See FELIx FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 77-89 (1927).
35. See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago
Conspiracy Trial, 16 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 381, 386-91 (2004)
(analyzing how William Kunstler used trial of "Chicago 7" for alleged illegal acts
committed in protests during 1968 Democratic Convention to seek to amplify
causes of defendants and mobilize public opinion); cf. Peter Margulies, The
Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients
Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD.L. REv. 173 (2003) (discussing radical
lawyers' sense of solidarity with the ideological positions of their clients).
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lawyers developed sophisticated strategies aimed at
educating or influencing the jury pool in areas where a trial
was pending, to either get an edge on the prosecution or
counter the pervasive negative publicity that capital
defendants often endure. 36 Feminist lawyers such as
Elizabeth Schneider used publicity and legal scholarship to
supplement courtroom advocacy on behalf of survivors of
domestic violence who pleaded self-defense after killing
their abusers. 37 Lawyers for movements that favored
sanctuary for undocumented aliens and refugees from
Central America or opposed United States military
installations and weapons programs also created media
campaigns designed to win public support. 38 Indeed, even
the Mafia had a media wing-attorneys who defended
alleged organized crime figures were aggressive in praising
their clients and questioning the credibility of their client's
sometimes to the point of enduring professional
accusers, 39
sanctions.
36. See Lee Hancock, Putting It on the Line: Indictment Threatens Lawyer's
Defense Career, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 1993, at 39A (discussing death
penalty attorney Millard Farmer's community-based strategy). See generally
Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER
L. REV. 443 (1999) (discussing rationales and motivations for committed
criminal defense work); Michael E. Tigar, Voices Heard in Jury Argument:
Litigation and the Law School Curriculum, 9 REV. LITIG. 177, 179-83 (1990)
(discussing his defense of a radical lawyer charged with perjury and making
false statements to federal agents).
37. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520,
567-70 (1992) (discussing importance of mobilizing communities on issues of
domestic violence); cf. Martha Minow, Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 Am. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 143, 153-57 (2002-03) (discussing difficulties of
collaboration between lawyers and clients in social struggles).
38. See RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994, at 10-11 (1995).
39. See Arnold H. Lubasch, Jury Hears Gotti Discuss Organization on
Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at B3 (discussing late mob boss John Gotti's
instructions on public relations to defense attorney Bruce Cutler); see also
United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding finding of
contempt for Cutler based on his repeated violations of a gag order); cf. Lonnie
T. Brown, Jr., "May It Please the Camera . . . I Mean the Court"--An
Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83 (2004)
(proposing solution to problems of prejudicial pretrial publicity).
Lawyers for defendants accused of genocide or other crimes against
humanity in international criminal trials sometimes address audiences outside
the courtroom. They tend to focus in these mobilization efforts on legal issues
concerning a tribunal's legitimacy, believing that more overtly political
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Publicity and mobilization have been important because
when public interest and civil liberties strategies have
relied too much on courts, they have often fallen short. For
example, the greatest legal battle in our country's historythe struggle to end segregation--contributed mightily to
fulfilling the promise of constitutionalism; however, as
Derrick Bell and others have pointed out, the model may
have neglected the wishes of parents and communities
whose primary focus was on greater resources for
education.40 Moreover, because the architects of the
desegregation campaign could not muster the political,
social, or legal strength to close exits available to white
families who headed toward the suburbs,
desegregation has
1
often given way to resegregation.
Teachers and theorists of public interest law have
oscillated between a focus on traditional advocacy in court
and an approach that stressed the larger community
context. While law school clinics historically emphasized
individual cases and lawyering tasks rooted in litigation,
such as interviewing and counseling,42 teachers and
arguments may often play into the hands of their adversaries who have
sufficient power to put defendants on trial and may also control access to the
media. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Representing Saddam Hussein: The
Importance of Being Ramsey Clark, 42 GA. L. REV. 47 (2007); Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal
Trials,48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 573-74 (2008).
40. See Ashar, supra note 30; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE L.J. 470 (1976). For an optimistic yet tempered view of Brown and its
results, see David B. Wilkins, Social Engineers or Corporate Tools: Brown v.
Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black Corporate Bar, in RACE,
LAw, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 139 (Austin
Sarat ed., 1997). Cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers:
Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 393-98
(2007) (discussing collective litigation generally).
41.

See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).

42. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (2d ed. 2004);
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisaland Refinement,
32 ARIz. L. REV. 501 (1990). Some clinicians involved in this enterprise have also
written insightfully on issues involving the representation of community
interests. See Paul R. Tremblay, Acting 'A Very Moral Type of God" Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice,37 UCLA L. REV.
1101 (1990); cf. Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
489 (1999) (discussing development of professional judgment based on
experience).
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theorists of public interest advocacy have recently stressed
the importance of mobilizing communities. 43 On this view,
litigation is merely one point on the mobilization
continuum.
B. Guantanamo as Lawyering Challenge
Detainee advocates' efforts at mobilization stemmed not
from ideology but from necessity. 44 The government turned
to Guantanamo after September 11 as a location where it
could detain, interrogate, 45 and try significant numbers of
detainees outside the reach of American law. 46 After the
43. See Alfieri, supra note 30; White, Mobilization, supra note 30; see also
Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121
HARv. L. REV. 805, 817-31 (2008). On occasion, lawyers for powerful and affluent
groups have used similar techniques on issues such as tort reform, arguing for
measures that restrict juries, heighten standards for pleading, and limit access
to lawyers. See CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001);
Anthony V. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1465, 1490-96
(2007) (book review) (discussing problems with tort reform advocates' portrayal
of tort litigation plaintiffs' lawyers as promoting frivolous litigation). See
generally Anthony Paik et al., Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization,
32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 883, 891-99 (2007) (discussing networks of conservative
lawyers).
44. Unlike many earlier lawyers, such as William Kunstler, who resorted
to mobilization as a tactic, few if any detainee advocates share the social or
political goals of their clients. For example, some detainees may view violence as
justifiable. The lawyers for detainees typically do not share this view. Rather,
the lawyers seem motivated largely by a commitment to norms of justice and
fairness in the legal system. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 4.
45.

See MARGULIES, supra note 4, at 132-34; JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE:

THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN
IDEALS 182-98 (2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND

THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 122-30 (2008). The legal literature on
torture and the war on terror is copious. See generally David Luban, Unthinking
the Ticking Bomb 4-15 (Geo. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 1154202), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154202 [hereinafter Luban, Unthinking] (discussing
ticking bomb scenario which philosophers employ to analyze whether torture is
ever justified). But cf. Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 271 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (arguing that although torture is
inherently wrong, government should initiate system of "torture warrants" to
promote transparency in situations where torture is likely to be used). Evidence
suggests that other professionals, including psychologists, participated in the
design and supervision of these interrogations. See generally M. Gregg Bloche &
Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3 (2005);
David Luban, Torture and the Professions, 26 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall
2007, at 2 [hereinafter Luban, Torture].
46.

See generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL

PRESIDENCY

AND

THE

SUBVERSION

OF

AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY

(2007).
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Supreme Court permitted detainees to file writs of habeas
corpus, 47 the government resolved to limit any possible
security risks posed by legal representation.48 Restrictions
were imposed, including requiring lawyers to submit their
notes of client conversations for a government security
check.
government had used Guantanamo in the past to seek to sort out refugees from
Haiti, although these efforts had also engendered litigation. Cf. Harold Hongju
Koh, The "HaitiParadigm"in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE
L.J. 2391 (1994) (discussing interplay of refugee law and foreign policy
concerns); cf. Stacy Caplow, "Deport All Students" Lessons Learned in an Xtreme Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 633 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSTEIN, supra);
Richard J. Wilson, Many Guantdnamos: A Reflection on the Work of Human
Rights Clinics, 13 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 46 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSTEIN, supra). See
generally BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW
STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT-AND WON (2005); Michael Ratner, How We
Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and Litigation,
11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187 (1998); Victoria Clawson et al., Essay, Litigating as
Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103 YALE L.J. 2337
(1994).
The government has also engaged in a range of activities domestically,
including various kinds of surveillance, some authorized by statute, and some
not. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political
Profiling, Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 631
(2004) (discussing FBI investigation of organizations); Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law After the USA PatriotAct: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 607 (2003) (arguing that Patriot Act provisions on surveillance
extended, rather than radically altered, existing surveillance law); Richard
Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists:Presidential
Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008)
(analyzing interaction of separation of powers and Fourth Amendment
concerns). Consideration of these topics is beyond the scope of this article.
47. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); cf. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534
F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (holding that
executive had authority to detain alien within the United States as enemy
combatant, but that alien had right in habeas proceeding to procedural
safeguards, including opportunity to seek exculpatory evidence and review
adverse evidence). In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), striking down the president's order on military
commissions, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) which
expressly authorized the commissions while adding procedural safeguards. The
MCA also barred judicial review (including habeas) outside of the procedure
outlined in the MCA. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109336, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. ch. 47A); cf. Jared A.
Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165. In Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Supreme Court struck down the portions of the
MCA that limited detainees' access to habeas corpus.
48. Many in the administration took a deeply cynical view of lawyers for
the detainees, believing them to be part of a campaign of "lawfare" mounted by
America's enemies. See Margulies, supra note 26.
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While the government has filed charges before military
commissions against a small number of detainees, it has
relied principally on Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) and Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) to
determine detainees' status. 49 The CSRTs do not allow legal
representation. They rarely provide a detainee with the
evidence against him. They also typically do not allow a
detainee to present evidence beyond the detainee's own
testimony.50 Forced to function without the procedural
guarantees of the 51
ordinary justice system, lawyers turned to
other approaches.

II. CROSSOVER LAWYERING: VENUES, VIRTUES, AND
PROSPECTIVE PITFALLS

The crossover effect driven by lawyers' turn to
mobilization has occurred in other areas of law. Plaintiffs'
attorneys confronting caps on punitive or non-economic

49. See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings:CSRT:
The Modern Habeas Corpus?, available at http://law.shu.edu/news/
final no hearing-hearingsjreport.pdf. (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). The
government has used military commissions in only a handful of cases. For ease
of reference, I use the term CSRT in the text to cover ARBs, as well, since the
two are identical in material respects.
50. While the CSRTs overall are not a fair process, information from these
proceedings now open to public scrutiny suggests that detainee statements
before the tribunals include some indicia of reliability, and that the CSRTs were
not quite the rubber stamp that detainee advocates have argued. The detainees
did not have to appear before the CSRTs. Those that did appear usually chose to
respond to the allegations against them. Many detainees denied the charges,
indicating that their testimony was not coerced. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES,
LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR

77

(2008). Detainee admissions in the course of their responses therefore provide
useful data on detainees' backgrounds. Id. Moreover, CSRTs did find that a
number of detainees-thirty-eight as of the end of 2007-had been erroneously
classified by the government. Id. at 82.
51. Moreover, the previous administration used features of crossover
lawyering to serve its own interests on law and terrorism issues. Former U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, for example, repeatedly made prejudicial
public statements prior to and during trial in a Detroit case that eventually
imploded because of prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Koubriti,
336 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (granting government's motion to dismiss
count in indictment); United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-27
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing history of Ashcroft's public comments); cf. ERIC
LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE IX-XV

(discussing Koubriti case).
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damages like pain and suffering shifted tactics.52 This shift
led to jury awards for compensatory or economic damages.5 3
In adapting to the cap regime, lawyers leveraged jurors'
holistic tendency to set damages based on their intuitive
sense of equity and just deserts, rather than on a judge's
5
legal instructions. 4
In the detainee context, lawyers dealt not only with
restrictions in applicable law but also with the need to
actually shift forums and audiences. For example, lawyers
expanded their strategy to include not only the factfinder in
a military commission but also officials in a detainee's
country of origin, who could pressure the United States for
the detainee's release. 55 The lawyers made arguments based
on equity, fairness, and just deserts that appeared more
difficult to assert in the commissions, and on occasion
achieved positive results for clients. 56
A. Varieties of CrossoverAdvocacy
Prodded by necessity, lawyers for detainees have been
resourceful in developing alternative strategies. These
strategies mobilize constituencies that can bypass the
Guantanamo procedural framework, and regain the
initiative for committed advocates. I discuss the principal
elements in this crossover advocacy repertoire below.
1. Advocacy with Foreign Governments. Perhaps the
most effective technique of crossover lawyering is advocacy
on a detainee's behalf with officials from his country of
origin. This advocacy is most successful when the country of
origin is an ally of the United States. Leveraging American
52.

See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 430-41.

53. See id. at 429; cf. David W. Leebron, FinalMoments: Damagesfor Pain
and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 313-16 (1989) (arguing that
despite limits on pain and suffering awards in wrongful death actions, jurors
may have exercised discretion to set damages reflecting such factors).
54. See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 431. Substitution effects studied by
economists encompass a related dynamic. Market factors encourage consumers
to substitute one good for another. For example, the high price of gas may
encourage more people to purchase bicycles. Cf. Tracey L. Meares et al.,
Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1171, 1174-75 (2004)
(discussing substitution effects).
55.

See Luban, supranote 1.

56.

Id.
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alliances involves a mix of media contacts, community
education, and informal bargaining with public officials. A
case in point here was the representation of the Australian
David Hicks by Major Michael "Dan" Mori and civilian
defense counsel Joshua Dratel. To execute the strategy,
Mori traveled to Australia, building popular support there
for Hicks' release57 Australian pressure on the United
States government culminated in a plea deal and Hicks'
release.
2. Formal advocacy-International Forums and
Domestic Tort Claims. In addition to seeking the release of
detainees, advocates have engaged in more formal advocacy
in alternative forums on human rights violations. For
example, advocates have sought damages for the
extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects. In Arar v.
Ashcroft,58 the plaintiff sought damages because of brutal
treatment he suffered when the United States rendered him
to Syria. 59 While even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
has acknowledged flaws in the United States' handling of
the case, Arar's lawsuit faces substantial legal barriers. 60
57. See id. at 2014-16; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds
Against All Odds: Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at

GuantanamoBay,

ROGER WILLIAMS

U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); Geoff Elliott,

Hicks's Ordeal 'Offends Principles of Justice,' AUSTRALIAN, June 23, 2005, at 4.
Mori risked retaliation for this tactic; the former Guantanamo chief prosecutor,
Morris Davis, who has since resigned and become a critic of the Bush
administration's approach, threatened Mori with contempt for terming the
military commissions a "kangaroo court"-a description particularly effective in
Australia. See Luban, supra note 1, at 2015.
Advocacy with the U.S. Congress contributed to victory in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). See JONATHAN MAHLER, THE CHALLENGE:
HAMDAN v.RUMSFELD AND THE RIGHT OVER PRESIDENTIAL POWER 221-23 (2008)
(describing how Professor Neal Katyal of Georgetown, lead counsel for detainee
Salim Hamdan, helped shape text and legislative history of Detainee Treatment
Act to increase chances that Supreme Court would hold that court-stripping
provisions were not retroactive).
58. 532 F.3d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. See id. Subsequent investigations failed to uncover any ties between
Arar and terrorists.
60. For one barrier, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (courts should dismiss suits
against federal officials in the face of "special factors counseling hesitation,"
arguably including embarrassment to a detainee's country of origin flowing from
revealing of its cooperation in the rendition effort). In addition, the state secrets
doctrine may bar provision of information to the defense, or even result in
dismissal of the case itself, if the court believes that the government cannot
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Comparable barriers face a lawsuit recently filed by the
Yale National Litigation Project on behalf of former
detainee Jose Padilla against John Yoo, author of the
"torture memos."61
In other cases not directly involving detainees but
relevant to international human rights, advocates have
sued corporations for aiding and abetting human rights
abuses abroad. In one recent case, CCR and the Seattle
University Law Clinic brought suit against the Caterpillar
Corporation, alleging that the defendant had aided and
abetted violations of international law stemming from
Israel's home destruction policy in the occupied territories.
The plaintiffs' theory was that Caterpillar had agreed to sell
its equipment to the United States government for re-sale to
Israel with notice that its equipment62 would be used to
implement the home destruction policy.
In other cases, detainees seek relief in foreign and
international venues. For example, CCR has sought to
invoke universal jurisdiction to subject former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to criminal prosecution in France
adequately defend itself without revealing sensitive information. See United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1953) (analyzing state secrets privilege);
see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SEcuRITY LAw 1043 (4th ed. 2007)
(noting that the sensitive information in the Reynolds case, which involved a
bomber crash, concerned human error and poor maintenance); Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1249, 1300-14 (2007) (discussing ways of modifying the state
secrets doctrine to promote fairness to parties suing government while still
respecting security needs).
61. See Padilla Complaint, supra note 5. The government detained Padilla,
a U.S. citizen formerly accused of plotting to assemble a bomb containing
radioactive material, at a brig in South Carolina, before winning a conviction
against Padilla on terrorist conspiracy charges. Cf. Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo] (limiting advice to "conduct of
interrogations outside of the United States"); Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of
the Dep't of Defense, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held
Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Yoo Memo], available at
http://www.aclu.orgtpdfs/safefree/yooarmy-torture-memo.pff.
62. Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing
lawsuit on ground that political question doctrine deprived the court of subject
matter jurisdiction).
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and Germany for alleged war crimes.63 Advocates also
initiated
proceedings
before
the
Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 64 and the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding a detainee
at Guantanamo charged with a war crime allegedly
committed while the detainee was fifteen years old.65
Supplementing these efforts, advocates successfully sought
disclosure of documents in Canadian courts regarding that
client's interrogation.66

63.

No Place to Hide: Filing Charges in France Against Rumsfeld,
FOR CONST. RTS. NEWSL.,
Winter 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/newsletters/CCRNewsletter-winter07.pdf.
CENTER

64. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR
(2006),
available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/chap.3c.htm
(explaining that the IACHR was granted precautionary measures, including
request that United States ensure that detainee, Omar Khadr, was not
subjected to torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, and that
United States not seek to admit into evidence any statement obtained through
such means).
65. See United States Diplomats, Opening Remarks Before United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child 15-16, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
englishlbodies/crc/docs/statements/48USAOpeningStatements.pdf;
see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE OMAR KHADR CASE: A TEENAGER IMPRISONED AT

GUANTANAMO 1 (June 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa
/us0607/usO6O7web.pdf (asserting that no international tribunal has ever tried
an individual for war crimes allegedly committed while the individual was
under 18 years old, while acknowledging that "international law allows for the
prosecution" of such individuals).
66. See Minister of Justice v. Khadr, [2008] 293 D.L.R. 629, 2008 SCC 28
(Can.); cf. Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2009] EWHC 152 (Admin.) (British court declined to disclose material detailing
treatment of detainee because of concerns that disclosure would injure security
ties with United States); Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC (Admin.) 2048 (Eng.) (holding that
British government had to make available to detainee evidence that, inter alia,
related to detainee's claim that he had been subjected to coercion while in
custody in Pakistan and that the British government knew or should have
known about the conditions of his custody when they questioned him); R (In re
Mohamed) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008]
EWHC
(Admin.)
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/
documents/2008_0829MohamedUKJudgment2.pdf (noting that the United
States had agreed to make evidence of Binyam's mistreatment available to
official supervising military commissions, but that British government in
refusing to make evidence directly available to Binyam's attorneys had failed to
consider importance of expressing abhorrence at torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment).
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3. Media Relations and Stories of Innocence and Abuse.
Lawyers for detainees have also made extensive use of the
media, including stories in papers and books about the
innocence of particular detainees and the abuse they
suffered, 67 and systemic studies about procedural problems
at Guantanamo.68 Stories of innocence have long been a
central element in advocacy for individuals and groups
detained by the state, including Sacco and Vanzetti, 69
convicted atom spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg during the
McCarthy era, 70 and the tens of thousands of JapaneseAmericans detained during World War 11.71 In some
detainee cases after September 11, advocates have
recounted horrendous tales of abuse.7 2 In other cases,
lawyers have advanced claims of innocence on their client's
behalf. These claims take two forms. One is a generic claim
that virtually all detainees at Guantanamo are students,
journalists, or relief workers scooped up by bounty
hunters.7 3 I call this generic claim the misadventure
narrative.7 4 Other innocence claims are more specific, telling
stories that sometimes leave puzzling
gaps 75 and sometimes
7
offer clear and consistent details. 6
67. See Ex-Terror Detainee Says U.S. Tortured Him, CBS NEWS, Mar. 30,
2008, http://www.cbsnews.com (search for '"Murat Kurnaz") (telling story of
detainee Murat Kurnaz via his attorney, Professor Baher Azmy of Seton Hall
Law School).
68.

See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 49.

69.

See FRANKFURTER, supra note 34.
70. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 2035, 2040 (2000) (book review) (noting that Julius Rosenberg was almost
certainly guilty of espionage, although his wife Ethel's guilt and the advantage,
if any, that Rosenberg's conduct afforded the Soviet Union are still matters of
vigorous debate).

71.

See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 362 (1983).

72.

See

SMITH,

supra note 4.

73. See Carol D. Leonnig, Judges Question Lack of Prisoner Rights:
Detainees in Cuba Want Ability to Fight 'Enemy Combatant' Claims in Court,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005, at A5 (explaining that Tom Wilner, a lawyer for
Kuwaiti detainees, claimed that he told the U.S. government, "You've got the
wrong guys . . . [tihey were captured by mistake, turned over by bounty
hunters.").
74. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (pointing out empirical
flaws in misadventure narrative).
75. See id. at 52-53 (describing in elliptical and evasive fashion client
Binyam Mohamed's time in Pakistan); see also infra notes 158-62 and
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4. Advocacy on the Identity of the Legal Profession.
Another brand of crossover advocacy has addressed the role
of the legal profession itself7 in championing the rule of law
after September 11. Government restrictions in previous
moments of American history, including World War I and
the Cold War, inspired approval or equivocation from the
organized bar. 78 After September 11, the organized bar
initially stayed on the sidelines, and death penalty lawyers
like Clive Stafford Smith and Joseph Marguliesaccustomed to working with clients with nothing to losetook the lead, along with the Center for Constitutional
Rights (CCR), which had long specialized in "political
litigation" involving foreign policy. However, the past six
years have seen increasing involvement by the ABA and by
mainstream law firms, particularly in representing
detainees who have been through CSRTs at Guantanamo
and are seeking habeas relief in the federal courts. 79
CCR is now in significant part a mainstream
organization, not a fringe one. Its resources have increased
substantially, as has its staff. In contrast, legal advice
associated with the Bush administration has moved to the
fringe, as the organized bar critiqued positions that argued
for unilateral presidential power and the propriety of
accompanying text (noting inconsistencies in attorney's account of Binyam's
whereabouts).
76. See generally MURAT KURNAZ & HELMUT KUHN, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE:
AN INNOCENT MAN IN GUANTANAMO (Jefferson Chase trans., Palgrave Macmillan

2008) (2007).
77. For a recent study arguing that the profession has become moribund,
afflicted with formalistic routine instead of concern for substantive justice, see
JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY 34 (2005).
See also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 128-34 (1993) (arguing that the legal profession is in decline
because of atrophy of judgment and prudence).
78. For a history of bar discipline prompted of attorneys who opposed
government national security measures, see James E. Moliterno, Politically
Motivated Bar Discipline, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 725, 736 (2005) (noting, inter alia,
that the American Bar Association during the McCarthy Era recommended that
state bars require lawyers to take a loyalty oath).
79. See Jim Edwards, Former U.S. Judges Enter Fray Over Guantanamo
Detentions: Gibbons, Orlofsky and Sarokin Argue for Right of Habeas Review,
N.J. L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, available at http://www.gibbonslaw.com/files/
guantanamo bay2.pdf (discussing involvement of former federal judges and
Tom Wilner of Shearman & Sterling law firm, as well as NYU Law professor
and longtime litigator against the death penalty Tony Amsterdam).
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coercive interrogation.80 The Yale Project's lawsuit against
John Yoo8l is in some ways less about seeking relief for a
client than it is advocacy directed at establishing that Yoo
82
exceeded the role constraints that bind American lawyers.
Another more concrete battle involves the effort to
define and structure the roles of defense counsel at
Guantanamo and in other terrorism cases.83 The National
Association of Criminal Defense Counsel (NACDL) initially
asserted that lawyers could not ethically represent
detainees, because of government restrictions on the
attorney-client relationship.84 The NACDL has more
recently argued that the Sixth Amendment's fair trial
guarantee requires greater detainee access to classified
information.85
80. See SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 244-47 (discussing American Bar
Association task force report criticizing Bush administration's unilateralist view
of presidential power). Ironically, Jack Goldsmith, who as an academic had
helped build the intellectual foundation for the Bush administration's disregard
of international law, bridled at the unilateralist temperament of the
administration's policies and as a Justice Department official withdrew overly
broad legal opinions. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 71 (2007) (describing the
displeasure at Goldsmith's decision expressed by David Addington, Vice
President Cheney's counsel). Cf. ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 173-85 (2008) (discussing "palace revolt" of Goldsmith and
other senior administration lawyers, including Attorney General John Ashcroft,
over initial formulation of Terrorist Surveillance Program). But see id. at 58
(arguing that international law was often used by enemies as "lawfare" against
America); Margulies, supra note 26 (discussing Goldsmith's role in developing,
along with Yoo, intellectual predicate for much of the Bush administration's
approach to international law).
81.

See Padilla Complaint, supra note 5.
82. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text (critiquing pleadings in
lawsuit).
83. See Margulies, supra note 35, at 174-75.
84. See Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participatein Rigged Systems? The
Case of the Military Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005).
The NACDL, perhaps reacting to the possibility of enhanced procedural
safeguards following the Supreme Court's expected decision in Boumediene, has
recently revised its view, and announced a joint effort with the American Civil
Liberties Union to provide representation to alleged senior Al Qaeda figures
now at Guantanamo. See William Glaberson, 2 Groups to Help Defend Detainees
at Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at A16.
85. See Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant/Appellant, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 06-4494,
2008 WL 594566 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008).
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Advocacy in and out of court has also centered on the
role of lawyers from the Judge Advocate General (JAG)
Corps in representing detainees. The Pentagon has assigned
a JAG lawyer to each Guantanamo detainee. Binyam
Mohamed, a detainee facing a military commission hearing
in early 2006, told his JAG lawyer, Lt. Col. Yvonne Bradley,
that he did not wish to be represented by a lawyer from the
military. Bradley in turn was uncomfortable with the set-up
of the JAG defense office for detainees, where she worked in
cubicles near lawyers for other clients whose interests, she
argued, were adverse to those of Binyam. 8 6 Binyam's
defense team, which also included civilian counsel, secured
expert affidavits stating that Bradley's representation of
Binyam constituted a conflict of interest.87 After a
confrontation between Bradley and a military judge in open
court, the commission case against Binyam was adjourned88
Other professions have also seen the emergence of advocacy campaigns
seeking to curb participation in Bush administration counter-terrorist activities.
Psychologists may well have used information obtained through treatment of
detainees to assist interrogation. Psychiatrists may have been involved as well
in designing interrogation regimes, including those that relied on techniques of
humiliation and protracted discomfort, disorientation, isolation, and sleep
deprivation. See Luban, Torture, supra note 45, at 60-63; Letter to Sharon
Brehm, President of the American Psychological Association (June 6, 2007),
http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/openletter
tosharonbrehmfinalnp.pdf; see also Benedict Carey, Psychologists Clash on
Aiding Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at Al. Anthropologists have
not assisted in interrogations at Guantanamo, but have assisted U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, contributing knowledge of local customs. See Luban, Torture,
supra note 45, at 63. University institutes, such as Harvard's Carr Center, have
hired fellows who are members of the military. See Patricia Cohen, Scholars and
the Military Share a Foxhole, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at B9.
Advocates, including entities such as the American Psychological Association
and Physicians for Human Rights, have called for limiting the participation of
professionals in some of this work. See Leonard S. Rubenstein, First, Do No
Harm: Health Professionalsand Guantdnamo, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 733, 74647 (2007).
86.

See Luban, supra note 1, at 2007.

87.

Id. at 2008.

88. Plea negotiations also have occurred. See Raymond Bonner, U.S. and
Britain at Odds Over Guantdnamo Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A16;
infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing tactics of Binyam's
current civilian counsel in generating publicity on behalf of his client); infra
notes 182-88 and accompanying text (discussing merits of conflict of interest
claim). In February 2009 the United States released Binyam to British
authorities, who freed him after a short period of questioning. See Richard
Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, Mohamed's Long Walk to Freedom as Debate
Rages,
GUARDIAN,
Feb.
25,
2009,
at
6,
available
at
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B. The Virtues of Crossover Advocacy
Crossover advocacy has virtues that benefit both clients
and the legal system. It can maximize client voice, enhance
clients' negotiation posture, and gain time when traditional
advocacy has led to a dead end. It also strengthens
promotes
and
resources
institutional
advocates'
transparency and procedural fairness. These virtues are
addressed in the following subsection.
1. Maximizing Client Voice. Crossover advocacy can give
voice to the voiceless. The government has separated
detainees from the outside world, impairing their ability to
communicate with friends and family. The detainees have
little voice in the time and nature of their own detention,
which is itself psychologically damaging. Crossover
advocacy can amplify this voice. 89 For example, law
professor Baher Azmy disclosed the specific and concrete
allegations of mistreatment made by his client Murat
Kurnaz. 90 Azmy's aggressive advocacy in the media and his
strategy of mobilizing the German public to press for
Kurnaz' release allowed his client to participate vicariously
in the burgeoning international debate about conditions at
the camp. It also paved the way for his client's eventual
release from Guantanamo.
The virtues of voice also apply to other crossover tactics.
Hunger strikes, for example, allow detainees to seize the
initiative and play a role in shaping the agenda. On a more
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/25/guantanamo-binyam-mohamedtorture.
89. The advocate's expression of empathy with the detained client on a
human level is a neglected element of representation. See SANDs, supra note 45,
at 158-62 (describing representation of detainee Mohammed al-Qahtani by
attorney Gita Gutierrez, formerly of CCR); cf. Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting
Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999
(2007) (discussing lawyering issues arising because of differences of language
and culture with clients); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building CrossCultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 33 (2001)
(acknowledging collaboration with Jean Koh Peters, a clinical professor at Yale,
in developing teaching module on lawyering across cultures); Peter Margulies,
Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 605
(1999) (addressing issues of cultural difference); Margulies, supra note 35, at
174 (describing conception of "affective solidarity" with client, as opposed to
solidarity with ideological or operational client goals).
90.

See Baher Azmy, Epilogue to KURNAz & KuHN, supra note 76, at 239-55.
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abstract level, so do proceedings in international forums
such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
The same virtue applies to symbolic advocacy, such as onthe-record statements in military commission proceedings
that convey the client's sense of absurdity, desperation, and
injustice.
2. Enhancing Clients' Options and Negotiating Posture.
Crossover advocacy also has instrumental advantagesattributes that increase the chances of a favorable outcome
for the client. Crossover advocacy adds to the portfolio that
an attorney can use to secure the detainee's release. Since
the situation is fluid, any tactic may create synergies among
officials, organizations, and lines of argument that brighten
the prospects for release.
For example, advocacy with an international human
rights organization like the rapporteur for a United Nations
committee might yield the name of a sympathetic State
Department official, or a contact in the consulate of the
detainee's country of origin. Crossover advocacy, even when
it fails to show concrete results, can provide talking points
that enrich such informal contacts. These talking points can
promote a climate more favorable to the detainee.
Similarly, advocacy for an American political candidate,
reflected in strategies such as the e-mail list "Habeas
Lawyers for Obama," may open another window. Obama
included the restoration of habeas and the closing of
Guantanamo in his stump speech. If he can deliver on his
promises,91 that result will be at least as effective as any
court decision.
Crossover advocacy can also strengthen a party's
negotiation posture. Consider here the stance of the NACDL
that it was unethical for criminal defense lawyers to
participate in the military commission proceedings at
Guantanamo. This posture was helpful in securing greater
91. Cf. Ratner, supra note 46, at 200-04 (noting political cross-currents that
complicated Clinton Administration's decisions about Haitians with HIV
detained at Guantanamo in the early 1990s); infra notes 251-53 and
accompanying text (noting that closure of Guantanamo will not be a solution if
the government outsources its detention of terror suspects to friendly
governments around the world). Shortly after assuming office, President Obama
issued an executive order providing for the closure of Guantanamo in a year's
time. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps
Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at Al.
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leeway for at least one noted criminal defense lawyer,
Joshua Dratel, in fashioning a more user-friendly
set of
92
rules governing attorney-client relationships.
Intraprofessional advocacy was also helpful in gaining
time. For example, consider the conflict of interest
allegations made by Lt. Col. Yvonne Bradley in early 2006
regarding
her representation of detainee
Binyam
Mohamed. 93 The conflict of interest claim, while not a strong
argument on the merits, 94 was a colorable tactic that gained
Binyam a valuable reprieve. Shortly after the adjournment,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld holding that the president lacked authority to
convene a95 tribunal without additional procedural
protections.
3. Strengthening Advocacy Identity and Institutions.
Crossover advocacy also allows groups to make statements
about themselves and others. For example, advocates for
the detainees are making a statement about the importance
of fairness, equality, and checks and balances. Attorneys
representing detainees, including death penalty lawyers
like Joseph Margulies and Clive Stafford Smith and $800
per hour partners from major firms, are making a
statement about the values that bind them together in a
common profession.

92.

See Cheh, supra note 84, at 397.

93.

See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.

94. The difficulty on the merits arises because there is no concrete evidence
that other JAG lawyers represented individuals whose interests conflicted with
Binyam's. See generally United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 90-91 (2d Cir.
2002) (discussing standard for disqualification of defense lawyer based on
conflict of interest). Binyam has been linked with detainees who were not at
Guantanamo at that time-Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen never detained at
Guantanamo, and Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), "highvalue" detainees moved to Guantanamo months after Binyam's hearing. See
SMITH, supra note 4, at 69 (discussing government's allegation of link between
Binyam and Padilla); Bonner, supra note 88 (reporting that government has
asserted links between Binyam, Zubaydah, and KSM). Currently, KSM is
asserting that he wishes to represent himself. If he gets his wish, no conflict will
arise with Binyam's representation by a military lawyer. Meanwhile, whatever
the merits of Bradley's conflict of interest claim in 2006, she continues to
represent Binyam. See R (B. Mohamed) v. Foreign Sec'y, [2008] EWHC (Admin.)
2048, [54], [126] (Eng.) (discussing Bradley's involvement).
95. See 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

2009]

THE DETAINEES' DILEMMA

375

Crossover advocacy can both affirm an organization's
ongoing commitment to change and nurture habits that
keep the group on the cutting edge. For a group like CCR,
for example, work seemingly on the fringe like filing
lawsuits against foreign officials for committing torture
helped keep the group honest. In a legal world where donors
and others can continually exert pressure for a group to join
the mainstream, a commitment to advocacy outside
conventional forums was a self-binding mechanism that
shielded the group from cooptation. CCR's pioneering work
on enforcing global human rights through the Alien Tort
Statute also sent a message that foreign affairs were not
immune from the rule of law. This rejection of artificial
distinctions between the domestic and international spheres
was central to the Guantanamo advocacy efforts after
September 11.
4. Promoting Transparency and Procedural Integrity.
Crossover advocacy can also enhance the integrity and
transparency of legal processes. Consider here the effort of
the defense lawyers in Hamdan to disqualify Brigadier
General Thomas Hartmann, who served as Legal Adviser to
the "Convening Authority" of the Guantanamo military
commissions. In this successful effort, the defense lawyers
cited evidence that Hartmann had failed to act impartially
in his role. An article published on the Harper's Magazine
website questioned Hartmann's independence, asserting
that he had manifested a public bias in favor of conviction.
The military judge who granted the defense motion to
disqualify Hartmann from participating in further
commission proceedings concerning Hamdan cited this
piece,96 and further noted that the former chief prosecutor
at Guantanamo, Morris Davis, had testified that Hartmann
had demanded that Davis select "sexy" cases for

96. See United States v. Hamdan, D-026 (Military Comm'n, May 9, 2008) at
6 (motion to dismiss (unlawful influence), Allred, J.), available at
(citing
http://www.nimj.org/documents/Hamdan%2OHartmann%2ORuling.pdf
Scott Horton, The Great Guant6namoPuppet Theater, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 21,
2008, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2008/02/hbc-90002460). Military
Judge Allred also cited Hartmann's publicly aligning himself with the
prosecution and his "nanomanagement" of the prosecutor's office as
demonstrating his lack of independence. Id. at 11.
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prosecution, the better 97to improve the administration's
image in an election year.
Regardless of the ultimate decision in Hamdan's case, 98
reducing the pressure to bring media-friendly cases and
limiting the ties between the Commission's overseers and
compromised administration officials enhanced the integrity
and transparency of the military commission system.
Seeking Hartmann's disqualification allowed the military
judge to take one tentative and provisional step to restore
the commission's claim to compliance with the rule of law.99
C. PotentialPitfalls of CrossoverAdvocacy
Unfortunately, there is no free lunch. Along with
virtues, crossover advocacy faces potential pitfalls. These
pitfalls reflect the nature of crossover effects and the
pervasive role of cognitive bias. I outline these issues briefly
here, and offer a couple of cautionary tales from crossover
advocacy's history.100
1. Crossover Effects and Unintended Consequences.
Crossover
effects
inevitably
trigger
unintended
consequences. Consider again the effect produced by caps on
tort damages. Even though juries often award higher
damages for uncapped categories such as compensatory
damages and economic loss, caps trigger negative
externalities. Lawyers seeking the benefits of the crossover
effect in tort litigation are more likely to take on "safe" cases
where a victim's injuries are severe and easy to prove, and
97. United States v. Hamdan, D-026 (Military Comm'n) at 11.
98. See William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to a Short
Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at Al (reporting that Hamdan was convicted of
material support of Al Qaeda after a trial in the summer of 2008, and received a
sentence of five-and-one-half years including time served); Yemen Releases
Former bin Laden Driver From Jail,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A9 (reporting
that Hamdan was released from custody in Yemen after his departure from
Guantanamo). On possible opportunity costs of seeking Hartmann's
disqualification, see Dan Ephron, A Plea Deal Vanishes, NEWSWEEK, May 19,
2008, at 5 (reporting that Hartman's disqualification may have delayed plea
negotiations in Hamdan's case).
99. A comparable process occurred in South Africa. See ABEL, supra note
38; STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY

(1992).

100. The following three Sections address these risks in greater depth. See
infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
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avoid cases involving disadvantaged groups where proof of
economic harm is more difficult. 1 1
Crossover phenomena in other areas of regulation yield
similarly mixed results. For example, consider the
differential in sentencing that for years governed the
prosecution of crack versus powder cocaine. Commentators
have argued that this sentencing differential triggered a
substitution effect: Increased penalties for trafficking in
relatively
crack encouraged wrongdoers to turn to 10another
2
less regulated commodity, such as heroin.
Crossover effects can also occur in the interplay
between substantive and procedural rules. Consider here
the effect of legal rules that expand liability for human
rights violations in international forums. Confronted with
substantive rules that appear to create an absolute
entitlement to wide-ranging remedies upon a finding of a
violation, judges often appear to hedge in the realm of
procedure, devising rules that limit the scope of the
tribunal's authority. 10 3 The same hedging may occur when a
forum lacks procedural obstacles to keep out claims. In this
situation, an absence of procedural obstacles inspires judges
to recreate the effects of procedural barriers in the
substantive realm, yielding substantive results that are
ambiguous or equivocal.104
The modern interplay of criminal law and criminal
procedure has featured the same dynamic. In the area of
criminal procedure, lawyers asked the courts to expand
and coerced
intrusive
searches
against
remedies
interrogation. However, as the courts sought to curb law
enforcement overreaching through the exclusionary rule,
they also triggered a political backlash exploited by
conservatives. This dynamic led to substantial broadening
of substantive offenses, including the laws criminalizing
101. See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 489-90.
102. See Meares et al., supra note 54, at 1176. As this example
demonstrates, the crossover effects created by asymmetries in accountability
can harm the public. Analogous adverse consequences plague crossover
advocacy. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (discussing risks of
crossover advocacy).
103. See Starr, supra note 11.
104. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 247, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
files/95/7495.pdf (considering when states may use nuclear weapons).
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drug possession in which Fifth Amendment rights posed
less of an obstacle to prosecution.105
Commentary has also discerned a potentially harmful
role for crossover effects in administrative law. A scholar
recently engendered controversy by arguing that the
Supreme Court's greater deference to administrative agency
decisions accompanied by formal rulemaking procedures 106
distorts the substance of agency positions.07 This view takes
as a premise that formal procedures are more costly for the
agency. Once an agency decides to make the investment in
more costly formal procedures, the agency will also be more
inclined to push the substantive envelope. 0 8 In this way, the
agency will recoup through the courts' substantive
deference the costs the agency incurs through greater
procedural formality. According to the theory, the crossover
effect's net result will therefore be more judicial deference
for substantive agency positions that show less respect for
statutory text and purpose.
2. Cognitive Biases and Crossover Effects. Crossover
effects occur because changes in one realm are not
independent of other domains, but instead are endogenous
to changes elsewhere. 109 Actors in the legal system seeking
to manage change must reckon with the endogeneity of
changes across legal domains. However, cognitive biases
obstruct such an assessment. The two central flaws that
impede this task are the temporal discounting deficit and
self-serving bias. I address each in turn.

105. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 29
(2007); Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2209, 2236-60 (2003) (discussing factors that broaden the scope
of criminal liability under federal statutes); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological,
supra note 13.
106. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
107. See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 552-55; see also Emerson Tiller &
Frank B. Cross, Modeling Agency/Court Interaction, 121 HARv. L. REV. 13, 1416 (2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forumlissues/120/
dec06/tiller-cross.pdf (discussing strategic substitution theory).
108. See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 555.
109. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 107, at 14 (criticizing view that agency
rulemaking is "fixed and exogenous," as opposed to responding to signals and
incentives from judges and other actors).
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Lawyers, like other human beings, tend to overweigh
short-term benefits and underestimate long-term costs.11o
Some discounting of future effects is always appropriate,
because of the present value of goods currently enjoyed.
However, human beings discount the future more than a
rational actor should. As a result, people frequently seek
short-term benefits and downplay long-term risks. Common
examples include savings rates, which are typically lower
than they should be given appropriate intertemporal
choices,, 1 and addiction rates, which are higher than
1 12
appropriate intertemporal discounting would recommend.
Self-serving bias often exacerbates the problems caused
by the temporal discounting deficit. People tend to
exaggerate their own responsibility for successes, and
underestimate their own control over failures." 3 Consistent
with this self-serving bias, people tend to value traits that
they believe they possess, and discount the utility of traits
possessed by others."14 People also tend not to plan
effectively, overweighing factors like convenience that serve
110. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 13, 33 (George Loewenstein et al., eds.,
2003); Jolls et al., supra note 21, at 46; Laibson, supra note 21; George
Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in IntertemporalChoice: Evidence and
an Interpretation, 107 Q. J. ECON. 573 (1992) (surveying phenomenon);
Loewenstein et al., ProjectionBias, supra note 21; Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew
Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999) (discussing
"present-biased preferences"); Fritz L. Laux & Richard M. Peck, Economic
Perspectives on Addiction: Hyperbolic Discounting and Internalities 4, 7-9 (Nov.
1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1077613
(discussing intertemporal anomalies in context of addiction); see also Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, ConstitutionalShowdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991,
1029 (2008), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/pdfs/156-4/Posner.pdf
(asserting that governmental institutions such as the courts, executive, and
Congress have a limited "time horizon" that fails to capture harms to future
generations).
111. See Laibson, supranote 21.
112. See Laux & Peck, supranote 110.
113. For discussions of self-serving bias and egocentricism in cognitive
processing, see Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 22, Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situational Character:A CriticalRealist Perspective on the Human
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 161 (2004), Keysar & Barr, supra note 22; Pronin et al.,
supranote 22.
114. See David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES,

supra note 22, at 324, 332-33.
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short-term interests, and underestimating potential
obstacles. 115 In a related phenomenon, people planning a
project consider internal features of the specific project, but
ignore or discount crucial base-rate information about
comparable projects, including their own track record for
project completion.116
The interaction of crossover effects and cognitive biases
creates a perfect storm of problems for advocates. Advocates
will tend to underestimate crossover effects that harm their
client in the long-term, and overestimate those that help
clients in the short-term. Advocates who seek to cross over
from one role to another, such as moving from scholar to
advocate, will also systematically discount the incidence
and extent of role conflicts.
3. Crossover Effects and Cautionary Tales. Evidence of
this unhealthy alliance of crossover effects and cognitive
biases appears even in early narratives of American
lawyering. Consider again the example of Josiah Quincy,
who along with John Adams distinguished himself by
successfully defending British soldiers prosecuted for their
role in the Boston Massacre. A related case handled by
Quincy in this same period provides a less sanguine
perspective. Quincy argued self-defense on behalf of an
informer for the British who killed a member of an angry
assemblage of patriots surrounding his home.11 7 However,
after his client's conviction, Quincy wrote a pamphlet under
a pseudonym condemning the judge in the case for
protecting the defendant from a lynch mob. Quincy, the
patriotic pamphleteer, also apparently agitated for the
death penalty for his own client. 118 There is no evidence that
Quincy was troubled by this conflict of roles between

115. See Roger Buehler et al., Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and
Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 22, at 251-52 (discussing overconfidence in predictions of project
completion).
116. See id. at 253-55. Here, as elsewhere, how people identify a relevant
data set and frame available data is crucial. See also Richard W. Painter,
Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules, and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1399, 1413-18 (2000) (discussing how prospective gains and losses affect
decision-making).
117. See PORTRAIT OFA PATRIOT, supra note 32, at 24.
118. The informer was ultimately allowed to leave the colony. Id. at 25.
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diligent courtroom advocate and anonymous agitator
against his client's interests.
For a more recent cautionary tale of crossover
lawyering, consider the example of radical lawyer Lynne
Stewart. 119 Stewart displayed a commendable human
concern for the well-being of a client, Sheik Abdel-Rahman
(the so-called "blind Sheik"), who was spending life in 12a0
federal prison after a conviction on terrorism charges.
Perhaps moved unduly by the short-term need to secure the
release of the sheik, whose legal appeals had been
exhausted, Stewart turned to crossover advocacy. After
extended consultation with her imprisoned client and his
prison
from
concealed
Stewart
which
associates
12
was
Sheik
the
that
authorities, ' she publicly announced
had
his
group
a
cease-fire
for
abandoning his support
an
earlier
over
revulsion
of
public
agreed to because
terrorist attack. 22 Stewart apparently hoped that the threat
of violence from the Sheik's supporters would prompt his
release.123 In indulging this hope, she failed to consider that
the lawyer's role does not generally include purveying
threats of violence. Stewart was ultimately convicted of
conspiracy to assist terrorist activity, 24 and the government
119. See Margulies, supra note 35, at 174.
120. See id. at 183-88; see also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1999).
121. Stewart had earlier signed an affirmation (the attorney's equivalent of
an affidavit signed under oath) agreeing not to communicate with her client
about plans for future violence.
122. See United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(declining to set aside conviction); see also Douglas Jehl, Islamic Militants Taunt
Cairo, Demanding Break With Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997 [PAGE] (group
claiming responsibility for attack that claimed lives of seventy tourists in Luxor,
Egypt, sought release of Sheik Abdel Rahman, and volunteered that it might
halt terror operations "for a while").
123. See Sattar,395 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (discussing Stewart, when informed of
a terrorist group in the Philippines that took hostages and offered to free them
in exchange for the Sheik's release, responding "Good for them").
124. See Julia Preston, Lawyer is Guilty of Aiding Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2005, at Al. In Stewart's case, as with other criminal defendants, the
issue of appropriate sentencing is distinct from the issue of culpability. See Julia
Preston, Sheik's Lawyer, Facing 30 Years, Gets 28 Months, to Dismay of U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at Al. Legal academics and others with a range of
views on Stewart's conviction wrote to the judge urging moderation in Stewart's
sentencing, because of her long history of capable criminal defense work and the
chilling effect a harsh sentence might have on the defense bar. See Letter from
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imposed even tighter restrictions on her former client the
Sheik. Stewart and her client thus became casualties of
crossover advocacy, led astray by the seductive ease of
informing the media about the Sheik's new cease-fire
position and Stewart's inability to look beyond the shortterm gratification that this announcement produced.
This cautionary tale demonstrates that crossover
advocacy has risks as well as benefits. Cognitive biases and
the dynamics of crossover effects make three issues salient.
First, asymmetries in accountability between traditional
judicial forums and crossover venues such as the media
cause risks. Lower levels of accountability in crossover
forums can lead to reckless advocacy, opportunity costs for
clients, and an echo-chamber effect in which preaching to
the converted prevails. Second, crossover advocacy prompts
conflicts of interest and roles that can injure clients and
undermine qualities of candor and deliberation that are
essential for both lawyers and legal scholars. Third,
crossover advocacy imposes negative externalities on the
public and the future interests of persons similarly situated
to clients. The next three sections of the article discuss
these issues in depth.
III. ASYMMETRICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS, OR THE
ADVOCATE'S TEMPTATION

Lawyers who do their work in the media or in
international forums are not subject to the constraints that
bind lawyers in United States courts. This absence of
constraints produces asymmetries in accountability. The
accountability gap allows lawyers to overestimate shortterm benefits and unduly discount long-term costs of
crossover strategies for their clients.
In court, lawyers confront a constellation of rules that
promote candor and fairness. For example, courts and
lawyers must refrain from ex parte contacts. 125 Lawyers
must also be candid with the tribunal, and refrain from

Peter Margulies, et al., to Judge John G. Uoeti (July 26, 2005) (on file with
author).
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (prohibiting ex parte
contacts between lawyer and client represented by another attorney). But cf.
Susan B. Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 916 (2005).
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misrepresenting material facts. 126 Lawyers in court must
public statements about matters at
also avoid prejudicial
127
issue in litigation.
Courts, too, are accountable actors, bound by rules that
promote fairness and transparency. Ex parte contacts are
forbidden. 28 Typically, the public and the media can view
briefs, read opinions, and attend court sessions. 29 When
courts avoid deciding a matter on the merits, they give
reasons that the public, the bar, and interested
commentators can critique. 30 In explaining their decisions,
courts face no artificial limits on the length of their
analysis.' 3 ' Moreover, courts have safeguards against
forum-shopping, including rules on venue, jurisdiction, and
random assignment. These rules prevent parties from
manipulating the system to find a sympathetic
decisionmaker.
A crossover forum such as the media lacks these
constraints on lawyers. On an institutional level, the
content of media coverage often hinges on the novelty of the
story and the accessibility of sources. Outlets for journalism
typically must survive in an increasingly competitive
and
eyeballs
where novelty attracts
marketplace,
from
departs
advertising. If a story counters expectations or
132
the norm, the media will feature it more prominently.
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009).
127. See MODEL
supra note 39.

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2009);

see also Brown,

128. See Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813 (R.I. 2007).
129. While recent developments in the war on terror have strained this
commitment to transparency, tribunals have reaffirmed its core attributes.
Even at Guantanamo, transcripts are available of many proceedings, including
CSRTs and ARBs. See WITTES, supranote 50.
130. When parties settle, however, they sometimes seek to keep their
agreements confidential. See Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy in Context: The Shadowy
Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2006) (critiquing
confidentiality provisions in employment discrimination settlements).
131. Although some weary readers might wish that judges limited
themselves. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting
combined opinions run over four-hundred pages in Lexis pagination).
132. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 138-40 (1998); Sendhil
Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias 7-8 (Dep't of Econ., Mass. Inst. Of
Tech., Working Paper No. 0233; Inst. for Econ. Reseach, Harvard Univ., Inst.
Research Working Paper No. 1981, 2002), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=335800 (contrasting ideological and institutional theories of media
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Man bites dog will always receive more attention than dog
bites man. A decision upholding the government's view may
seem like a dreary reversion to the mean, unlike the
compelling alternative story of the government's defeat. 133
The lack of transparency in the media's relationship
with sources compounds the distortion of the man bites dog
imperative. A source's contacts with journalists are often ex
parte, lacking notice to and input from adversaries.13 4 While
the other side's absence is often convenient for a source with
an agenda, it removes an important check. All other things
being equal, journalists give more play to the perspective of
players who talk to them, as opposed to players whose
media interaction is constrained by rules limiting disclosure

bias). The account in the text outlines institutional factors that skew media
coverage. This institutional account does not rely on claims that the media
follows a narrow political or ideological agenda. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN
AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT

CLINTON 248 (1999) (noting media's aggressive investigation of President
Clinton). Moreover, any institutional account must also acknowledge the
profoundly important role that the press plays in a democracy, particularly in
situations where the government has an incentive to conceal evidence of its own
overreaching. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The EspionageAct and National
Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1546 (2008)
(discussing importance of transparency in government and role of media in
promoting that objective).
133. See Thomas Kunkel, What You Don't Know: The Bush Administration's
Penchant for Secrecy, 28 AM. JOURNALISM REV. 4 (2006) (describing "man bites
dog" and attendant novelty as a significant factor in news coverage); Peter
Levine, Journalism and Democracy: Does it Matter How Well the Press Covers
Iraq?, 93 NAT'L CMC REV. 16 (2004) (noting government officials' ability to spin
news through manipulation of relationships with journalists; noting also that
press can overreact to spin and unduly discount information or perspective
provided by government officials); Jay Rosen, Bush to Press: "You're Assuming
That You Represent the Public. I Don't Accept That", [SOURCE], [DATE],
available at http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink2004/04/25
/bush_muscle.html (stating that "the president has his scripted points, the
reporters theirs-and neither will move off the script"). For a discussion of Bush
administration attempts to manage news and retaliate against journalists they
view as antagonistic, such as the Washington Post's Dan Milbank, see Ken
Auletta, Fortress Bush: How the White House Keeps the Press Under Control,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 2004, at 52-65.
134. See Michael C. Jensen, Toward a Theory of the Press, in ECONOMICS
AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS:

INSIGHTS FROM THE CONFERENCES ON ANALYSIS AND

IDEOLOGY 15 (Karl Brunner ed., 1979). While journalistic norms require that a

reporter seek comment from the targets of allegations, this norm is more
amorphous than the strict prohibition on ex parte contacts in an adjudicative
forum.

2009]

THE DETAINEES' DILEMMA

385

of trade secrets or national security information. 135 In
addition, the media does not constrain forum-shopping by
sources, since such rules would also constrain journalistic
parte
factors--ex
of these
competition. 136 Three
conversations, reliance on accessible sources, and the
absence of constraints on forum-shopping-also encourage
an echo chamber dynamic, in which participants preach to
the converted and pay insufficient attention to the longterm costs of their strategies.
A. Accountability and PretrialPublicity
To illustrate the consequences of this asymmetry in
accountability between judicial and crossover forums,
consider first the rule on refraining from prejudicial pretrial
publicity. 137 Limits on pretrial publicity ensure that a
party's claims receive their full ventilation in a transparent
forum-the courtroom-where the other side can test them
through cross-examination. 13s In a criminal case, pretrial
publicity rules assist both the prosecution and the defense
in obtaining a fair trial.
However, the rules against pretrial publicity have a
more subtle rationale that seeks to protect clients against
the consequences of reckless advocacy in the court of public
opinion. Advocacy in the court of public opinion is subject to
the temporal discounting deficit. Crossover advocates active
in that sphere risk incurring long-term costs as they
scramble for short-term tactical gains. The ethics rules, like
any constitutional mechanism, seek to align the parties'
incentives appropriately and correct the lawyers' imbalance
in perspective.

135. Of course, players such as government officials often break these rules,
through strategic leaks. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233

(2008).
136. Cf. Mullainathan & Shleifer, supra note 132 (discussing effects of
competition in journalism).
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROI'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2009); cf. Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (discussing pretrial publicity rules in First
Amendment context).
138. See Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit of Justice" in High Profile Criminal
Matters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1756-57 (2002).

386

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

The client-protective rationale for anti-publicity rules
recognizes that narratives have opportunity costs. 139
Statements made in advance of trial or in an opening can
lock defense counsel into a strategy that seems less than
optimal as the trial proceeds. For example, a seasoned
defense attorney may elect to rest without putting on a case
if the prosecution's case is weak. However, if the defense
attorney has announced an elaborate theory of the case in
the media or in her opening statement, the jury may expect
the
lawyer
to
follow
through.
The
factfinder's
disappointment at the lack of follow-up may seal the client's
fate. The rule against pretrial publicity flags these
opportunity costs for the lawyer, realigning short- and longterm perspectives.
Lawyers who believe that, regardless of publicity, they
must ultimately deliver in court what they promise in
public will have a different incentive structure than those
who believe that media coverage is a substitute for litigation
success. Consider the elaborate conspiracy theory spun by
lawyers for Omar Khadr, a Canadian national whose
parents apparently sent him to Afghanistan when he was
13 years old, and who when he was almost 16 allegedly
threw a grenade at a United States army medic under
circumstances that might constitute a war crime.140 Khadr's
139. One example from the courtroom itself derives from the opening
statement of defense attorney Marvyn Kornberg in the trial of a New York
police officer on charges that the officer shoved a broom handle up the rectum of
suspect Abner Louima. Trying to defend his client in this high-profile case,
Kornberg told the jury that the injuries that Louima had received had been
caused instead by consensual sex. See Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The
Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 930-31 (2000). Kornberg failed to produce evidence
supporting his claim. This failure to follow up may have contributed to his
client's conviction. In other settings, clear factual statements made by attorneys
in the course of judicial proceedings are binding. See Childs v. Franco, 563 F.
Supp. 290, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Statements out of court by the attorney will
typically not bind the client as a legal matter. However, they may prejudice the
client in other more insidious ways, by affecting jury pool perceptions.
140. See MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO'S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
OMAR KHADR 2-4 (2008); Sean Fine, A Most Peculiar Young Offender: Omar
Khadr Should be Dealt with Here in Canada, as a Juvenile Who Was Involved in
Terrorism, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 22, 2008, at A19; Adam Zigorin, Growing Up at
Guantanamo, TIME, June 5, 2006, at 16. Under international law, this
determination could hinge on Khadr's compliance with Common Article 4 of the
Geneva Convention, governing lawful combat, which considers whether he wore
a uniform, carried arms openly, fought in a unit with a fixed command
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lawyers, JAG lawyer William Kuebler and reserve officer
Rebecca Snyder, have asserted without any proof that
American soldiers including Khadr's alleged victim
participated in a conspiracy to kill wounded and
incapacitated inhabitants of a suspected Al Qaeda
compound. According to Khadr's current lawyers, Khadr's
alleged victim, Christopher Speer, was actually not a medic
at all, but simply another participant in 141
the plot, killed by
friendly fire as the conspiracy went awry.
In ordinary criminal practice, it would almost surely
violate Model Rule 3.6 to publicly announce in advance of
trial this kind of specific story. 142 Indeed, spreading the
story impinges on both the procedural integrity and
cognitive bias-correcting rationales for the rule. Since
anyone can announce a theory, but the adversarial testing
only comes at trial, there is no immediate cost to making
such pronouncements. Instead of focusing attention and
deliberation on the trial, where rules of evidence ensure
reliability, the pretrial dissemination of conspiracy stories
places a premium on the
receipt of media attention, with no
143
assurance of accuracy.

structure, or killed civilians. See infra note 173 (discussing factual and legal
issues in Khadr's case).
141. Posting of Marni Soupcoff to National Post, http://network.
nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2008/03/25/lt-cmdrwilliam-c-kuebler-and-rebecca-s-snyder-the-truth- about-child-soldieromar-khadr.aspx (Mar. 25, 2008, 19:35 EST).
142. The military justice system includes comparable ethical provisions for
attorneys. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 776.45(a)(1) (2000) (barring extrajudicial
statements with a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding or an official review process"); cf. Seth R. Deam, Does
Labeling the System "Unfair" Threaten Fairness? Trial Publicity Rules for
Defense Attorneys in Military Commissions, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 663, 668-70
(2006). The rules against prejudicial pretrial publicity apply to facts at issue in a
specific adjudication, not to questions of law concerning the fairness of the
tribunal. Accordingly, the rules should permit comments like those of Major Dan
Mori in his representation of detainee David Hicks that question the legality of
the commission system.
143. The shot-gun approach of Khadr's current lawyers is particularly
troubling because of one glaring substantive flaw in the conspiracy theory:
Khadr's survival. If soldiers were engaged in a conspiracy to cover up killing
Speer or enemy wounded, it makes little sense that they would have permitted
Khadr to survive. Cf. SHEPHARD, supra note 140, at 89-90 (discussing Khadr's
extensive shrapnel wounds and doctor's efforts to treat him). Leaving no
witnesses would have been the best way of effectuating the conspiracy's goals.
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Even absent short-term risk, however, conspiracy
theories like Kuebler's can harm a defendant. If the case
goes to trial, Kuebler's touting of the conspiracy theory will
create problems for his client. Suppose that Kuebler decides
not to present the theory at trial, but that the presiding
judge is aware of the prior publicity. The judge will conclude
that Kuebler did not act responsibly in spreading the
story. 144 While one hopes that the judge will still be
impartial in presiding over the proceeding, judicial
perceptions of counsel's trustworthiness inevitably affect
handling of a case. Moreover, the jury in a court martial or
military commission is composed, not of the peers of the
accused, but of military officers. Officers can be a talkative
bunch, and it would not be surprising if some of the officers
had become familiar with Kuebler's public charges. Here,
too, if Kuebler does not follow through at trial, the jurors
will draw their own conclusion about145 the claims and
defenses that Kuebler saw fit to advance.
In a system in which crossover advocacy triggered
accountability similar to that found in courts, Kuebler
would get unambiguous feedback from the media that
floating conspiracy theories is a risky endeavor.
Unfortunately, the media's institutional attributes impede
this feedback. For example, a journalist who covers
Guantanamo for a prominent newspaper failed to address
the conspiracy theory in the course of a laudatory front-page

144. However, Kuebler would not be subject to the heightened obligation of
candor found in rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, because he
did not make these charges before a tribunal. Kuebler would only be subject to
the weaker standard of honesty set out in rule 8.4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.3, 8.4 (2009).
One could argue that the far-flung nature of much of the media advocacy
efforts for detainees, which in Khadr's case focused mainly on Canada, also
reduces the likelihood that either the judge or the military judge will in fact be
aware of the publicity. In that event, the publicity is not actually prejudicial.
However, in a world where anyone with a computer can readily pull up
communications from a country half-way around the world, this view seems
naive. One could also argue that the military judge can impose restrictions on
pretrial publicity similar to restrictions a civilian court could impose. However,
a blanket restriction might unduly chill the lawyer's willingness to criticize the
legal sufficiency of the commissions. A more targeted restriction might be
reactive, fashioned by the judge only after the lawyer made prejudicial public
statements.
145. Voir dire can minimize prejudice, but not extinguish it.
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piece about Kuebler.146 The piece instead stressed the man
bites dog aspect of a military lawyer taking on the military
commissions at Guantanamo. The article alluded vaguely to
Kuebler's "incendiary" charges 147 but otherwise failed to
examine Kuebler's allegations. Diligent journalism in this
case would have required scrutiny of Kuebler's theory and
supporting evidence. Unfortunately, the man bites dog
imperative carried the day.
The resulting article provided Kuebler with the positive
feedback of a front-page story in a prestigious publication.
However, it failed to offer the context that the reader
needed to evaluate Kuebler's tactics. This accountability
deficit will encourage Kuebler to continue to circulate his
conspiracy theory to accommodating journalists, tying
Kuebler's hapless client to a conspiracy theory that may be
impossible to prove at trial.
For an even more clear-cut case in which an attorney's
propensity to play to the media may prejudice a
detainee/client, consider recent remarks by Clive Stafford
Smith that his client Binyam Mohamed might make false
statements in an allocution to reach a favorable plea
bargain. 148 In correspondence with the British Foreign
Office that Smith provided to a reporter, Smith asserted
that if necessary Binyam would plead guilty to "being the
Pope."149 Sarcasm has its place in legal representation,5
particularly given the tragic absurdity of Guantanamo.10
However, even the most committed lawyer/ironist should
recognize that public mockery of a client's credibility in plea

146. See William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in the Detainee's
Corner,N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at Al. While the specific episode discussed in
the text illustrates the risks of crossover advocacy, reporting on Guantanamo
has often been balanced and informative in the face of major obstacles. See
William Glaberson & Margot Williams, Next President Will Face Test on
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, at Al (discussing complexities of releasing
Guantanamo detainees where evidence points to their involvement with Al
Qaeda or the Taliban).
147. See Glaberson, supranote 146, at A23. The article usefully provides the
correct pronunciation of Kuebler's name (it's the same as the cookie).
148. See Bonner, supra note 88, at A16.
149. Id.
150. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 15 (describing the solicitude shown for
reptiles by Guantanamo personnel, who brake for iguanas).
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negotiations will likely raise the government's price in the
deal.151
B. Crossing Over and the Risk to Candor
Asymmetrical accountability also triggers tensions with
the lawyer's duty of candor. Framing the narratives that
fuel mobilization tempts the lawyer to omit material facts
that undermine the story. The legal ethics rules impose a
less rigorous standard on public statements than they do on
statements before a tribunal. 152 Nevertheless, one can argue
that a lawyer should not misrepresent matters with the
public. First, her professional status as an intermediary
between public and private interests implicitly warrants
some level of candor and fair dealing. Second, a lack of
candor undermines the capacity for reflection. People who
are not candid with others may also suppress inconvenient
facts in internal deliberation. However, because of the selfserving bias, people tend to underestimate the likelihood of
succumbing to this dangerous habit. Third, lack of candor
may be sound strategy in the short-term, but, like excessive
pretrial publicity, it may unduly discount long-term costs to
clients.
151. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998) (discussing how defense proffers to
prosecutors to reach plea bargains have largely replaced actual trials). Dan
Mori, the JAG lawyer representing Australian David Hicks, seemed to
understand this point. He and civilian lawyer Joshua Dratel used media
attention as leverage, and then pivoted to direct negotiations with the official
running the military commissions to secure a favorable deal for Hicks. See
Luban, supra note 1, at 2014-17; Yaroshefsky, supra note 57.
152. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009 (imposing
affirmative duty of candor with the tribunal), with id., R. 8.4 (prohibiting
dishonesty, which is generally interpreted to require proof of fraud or perjury).
As an illustration of the weak normative content of rule 8.4, consider that the
American Bar Association (ABA) has declined to find dishonesty when a lawyer
receiving an electronic document from an adversary mines the document for
"metadata," i.e., confidential information electronically embedded in the
document about comments on prior drafts and the like. The ABA merely
requires that the recipient inform the sender. See id., R. 4.4(b). For discussion of
this issue, see David Hricik, Mining for Embedded Data: Is It Ethical to Take
IntentionalAdvantage of Other People's Failures?,8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 231, 24547 (2007) (arguing for more robust duties); cf. Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling
Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 813-16 (2006) (analyzing issues and suggesting that
lawyer should have obligation to refrain from reading the document but need
not notify sender, unless lawyers agree otherwise).
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Lack of candor emerges in two kinds of narratives told
by crossover advocates. One is the generic misadventure
narrative used by lawyers to explain the presence of
detainees at Guantanamo as a group. I address the
empirical flaws in the misadventure narrative in a
subsequent section of the Article. 153 Here, I discuss the lack
of candor evident in specific claims of mistreatment or
innocence made on a client's behalf.154
In the most disturbing case, lack of candor in the media
spilled over into the courtroom. Candace Gorman, a solo
practitioner from Chicago, charged in the media that
Guantanamo doctors had given her client AIDS. 155 In court,
the clear weight of evidence forced Gorman to acknowledge
that she could not support this and other charges. 156 After
her court appearance, Gorman made her claims to a
columnist, who printed
them without mentioning the court's
adverse findings. 57

153. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
154. I do not claim that detainee lawyers as a group are less candid than
other attorneys. Indeed, my overall view is that the Guantanamo defense bar
illustrates the American legal profession's commitment to justice. However, the
cases I mention demonstrate a lack of candor that is both problematic in itself
and indicative of the tensions caused by asymmetric accountability mechanisms.
155. See H. Candace Gorman, The Hippocratic Oath Dies in Gitmo, Feb. 26,
2008, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3540/the hippocraticoath diesin_
gitmo (repeating insinuation while backing off express charge); see also Andy
Worthington, Horror at Guantanamo:Libyan Detainee Infected with AIDS, Jan.
1, 2008, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2008/01/31/horror-at-guantanamolibyan-detainee-infected-with-aids/ (reporting Gorman's claim).
156. See A1-Ghizzawi v. Bush, No. 05-2378 (JDB), 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis
27988, at *4-5 (D.D.C. April 8, 2008). The court also appeared skeptical about
the letter-writing campaign repeating these charges that Gorman had initiated.
Id. at *3 n.1.
157. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., A Prisonof Shame, and It's Our's, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2008, at WK13. Gorman also acted as a source for another
reporter on a story where she claimed that because of her Guantanamo work the
government was conducting illegal surveillance of her garden-variety criminal
defense clients in Chicago. See William Glaberson, Lawyers for Guantanamo
Inmates Accuse U.S. of Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at A18.
Gorman's claim here seems to reflect the same lack of professional distance that
skewed her advocacy about her client's medical charges. Cf. KRONMAN, supra
note 77, at 128-34 (discussing lawyer's need for balance between empathy and
detachment). The surveillance story also failed to mention the Al-Ghizzawi
Court's observation about Gorman's lack of credibility. A court subsequently
granted summary judgment to the government in a lawsuit that included
Gorman's claims. See Wilner v. NSA, No. 07-CIU-3883 (DLC), 2008 U.S. Dist.

392

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

An episode of this kind illustrates the temporal
discounting deficit that afflicts some crossover lawyering.
Gorman traded a short-term gain in publicity for long-term
costs to credibility. The court surely became aware that
Gorman seemed to draw the wrong lesson from the court's
rebuke. Gorman's lack of credibility made her less effective
as an advocate on her client's behalf.
Lack of candor can emerge in claims of detainee
innocence, as well. In writing about the Binyam Mohamed
case, Clive Stafford Smith asserted that a "friend" in
London offered Binyam the "use" of the friend's passport
while Binyam was in Pakistan.158 Binyam claims that his
own passport had been stolen.159 However, Smith failed to
note that Binyam's "use" of the passport entailed removing
160
the passport holder's picture and substituting his own.
Binyam's creative work with travel documents matched the
tactics of suspected terrorists who wished to cover up their
stay in Al Qaeda facilities.61 In fact, Binyam admitted in a
CSRT hearing in 2004 that he had received paramilitary
training at an Al Qaeda camp, including instruction in
LEXIS 48750, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2008) (relying on point of law without
findings on contested facts).
158. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 52-53.
159. Id. at 52.
160. See id. at 53; see also B. Mohamed v. Foreign Sec'y, 2008 EWHC
(Admin) 2048 [11] (Eng.). The obliging "friend" that Smith described was
apparently a "criminal" who was expert in document fraud. Id. at para. 49.
Smith also sought to finesse facts about Binyam's immigration status in his
initial interaction with Bonner. Bonner reported that Mohamed "acquired legal
residency" in Britain. Bonner, supra note 88, at A16; cf. Raymond Bonner,
Forever Guantanamo, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, April 17, 2008, at 54 (in review of
SMITH, supra note 4, Bonner states that Binyam "became a British resident").
However, this is not the case. Smith claimed that before Binyam left for
Pakistan in 2001, Britain had permitted him to remain while he pressed an
asylum claim filed in 1994. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 51. Smith did not
disclose that the government had rejected Binyam's asylum claim. See B.
Mohamed, 2008 EWHC 2048, at [7]. Actually obtaining legal resident status
would have required a comprehensive background check that Binyam has never
had to undergo. Smith also neglected to disclose that Binyam's college training
included the study of engineering and electrical work. Cf. SMITH, supra note 4,
at 51 (claiming only that Binyam had failed most of his college courses), with B.
Mohamed, 2008 EWHC 2048, at [7] (offering specific information about his
college study).
161. See John Crewdson et al., Evidence Emerges of a Broader 9/11
Conspiracy in Germany, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 26, 2003, at 1 (discussing Al Qaeda
suspect's use of stolen passport).
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forging official documents.162 This portion of the client's
story does not appear in Smith's accounts.
C. InternationalForums and Opportunity Costs
Other crossover forums, including international bodies
and domestic courts considering certain human rights
claims, also display differences in process, structure, and
proof that generate litigation less geared to concrete
adjudication than typical proceedings in United States
courts. First, international human rights litigation is often
ex parte as a practical matter. Frequently, opposite parties
do not respond, and claims proceed uncontested.163
Admittedly, declining to appear is the party's choice.
Nevertheless, conducting ex parte litigation can instill lax
habits in the advocate, who lacks the accountability
imposed by a vigorous adversarial contest.
International bodies are also not bound by Article III
constraints that discipline decisionmaking in United States
courts. International forums are not governed by the
political question doctrine, which deters federal courts from
deciding matters characterized by a dearth of judicially
manageable standards or a textual commitment of authority
to another branch. 6 4 Moreover, international tribunals
162. See Raymond Bonner, British Judge Sets Hearing on Evidence for
Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at A16; cf. B. Mohamed, 2008 EWHC 2048,
at [19], [87] (British court that viewed classified evidence and ordered
government to turn over information to detainee also noted that Binyam had
apparently worked on detonators for explosive devices for Al Qaeda and found
that officials were "right to conclude that [Binyam] was a person of great
potential significance and a serious potential threat to the national security of
the United Kingdom'). Smith argues that the CSRT testimony was the product
of coercion, although he concedes that Binyam was not subject to coercion after
his arrival at Guantanamo in May, 2004. B. Mohamed, 2008 EWHC 2048, at
[102].
Here, as in Al-Ghizzawi's case, it is useful to separate claims of innocence
from claims of abuse. Substantial evidence supports Binyam's claim that he
endured coercive conditions after his apprehension in 2002. See id. at para. 74,
87; Bonner, supranote 162.
163. See GOLDSTEIN, supranote 46, at 34 (noting that in much human rights
litigation defendants "didn't show up in court").
164. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-26 (2004) (stating because, inter alia, of Article III
concerns that bar federal courts from "aggressive" creation of common law,
norms enforced under ATS, 28 U.S.C. section 1350 (2005), should be "specific,
universal, and obligatory"); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary
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render advisory opinions which Article III precludes.165
American presidents of both political parties have argued
that these opinions seek
to resolve questions that are
"vague and abstract,166 lacking the concreteness that
should mark questions submitted to a tribunal.
As with media interaction, such asymmetries in
accountability turn into traps for crossover advocates. While
international forums frequently have a low threshold for
commencing litigation that entices advocates, this low
threshold can make them reluctant to issue an effective
remedy. An international tribunal may encounter profound
difficulties in enforcing a judgment against the wishes of a
sovereign government. 167 In some situations, such as those
raising federalism concerns, a sovereign state's own law
may hinder enforcement. 168 In other settings, the
effectiveness of international forums is hostage to an
internal crossover dynamic that trades off procedural
expansiveness and substantive caution. On this view,
InternationalLaw, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARv. L. REV. 869,
902-07 (2007) (analyzing Court's decision in Sosa in light of limits on federal
judicial power expressed in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). But see
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Legal System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 501-02 (2003) (arguing that political question doctrine is not an obstacle to
treaty that would agree to submit matters to international bodies for decision,
at least if domestic courts retained some discretion on enforcement). Federalism
is also an important constraint in the United States legal system that may bar
enforcement of judgments in international forums. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.
Ct. 1346 (2008) (holding that decision of International Court of Justice that
would override state procedural default rules in collateral review of criminal
convictions is not directly enforceable).
165. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (1996), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf (undertaking to decide when states may use
nuclear weapons).
166. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. at 236 (quoting U.S. legal representative as arguing that "[t]he
question [of propriety of threat or use of nuclear weapons addresses] complex
issues which are the subject of consideration among interested States and
within other bodies of the United Nations which have an express mandate to
address these matters"). My concern here is not with international law, per se,
which provides core norms that warrant respect, but with the vagaries of
procedure in international forums.
167. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2250 (asserting that "prudential
concerns" often lead a tribunal to avoid intrusion into the affairs of another
sovereign nation).
168. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at.
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adjudicative authority is a scarce resource, which
decisionmakers will ration regardless of the procedural
regime.169 Following this dynamic, international forums
compensate for low thresholds for initiating litigation by
rendering ambiguous or inconclusive decisions on the
merits. For example, in a case considering the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice
issued an advisory opinion that laboriously recited the
complexities of the question
to justify a decision that
0
resolved absolutely nothing. 17
The net result of advocates'
engagement in
international forums may thus be another example of
cognitive bias in temporal discounting. Advocates make a
big splash at the commencement of a proceeding, and then
endure an extended anti-climax as adjudication labors to an
uncertain
conclusion.
This
anti-climax
generates
opportunity costs for clients, measured in fruitless
expenditure of resources and the neglect of less glamorous
but more effective tactics such as a detainee's cooperation
with the government.
As a cautionary tale of international forums and
opportunity costs, consider again the case of Canadian
national Omar Khadr, who was fifteen years old when he
allegedly threw a grenade at a United States army medic in
Afghanistan.
Khadr's
lawyers
have explored
two
transnational forums. First, they sought relief from
allegedly abusive conditions of interrogation before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
Second, they sought relief both before the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Khadr's
military commission based on the argument that Khadr was
a child soldier who cannot be detained or tried for war
crimes committed while he was under 18.
Unfortunately, each of these gambits has been
predictably unproductive. The IACHR strategy resulted in
an announcement of "precautionary measures" that had no
169. See Levinson, supra note 12; Starr, supra note 11; cf. Posner &
Vermeule, ConstitutionalShowdowns, supra note 110, at 1047 (discussing this
concept in context of constitutional law).
170. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. at 263 ("[T]he Court . . . cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to
the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence.").
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practical effect on Khadr's detention. 171 The child soldier
strategy has been similarly unsuccessful. Advocates rested
their argument on the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.172 However, the Optional
Protocol, which governs the conduct of countries that use
child soldiers, does not bar prosecution of minors for war
crimes. 73 Moreover, Khadr falls well outside the profile of
the young combatants the Optional Protocol was enacted to
protect. For the months prior to the events giving rise to the
charges against him, Khadr was clearly free from coercion;
his father, who had indoctrinated him into Al Qaeda
ideology, was not even traveling with the family, and Khadr
was often the only male in the group after September 11 as
family members fled from anti-Taliban forces, including
Canadian troops. 174 Nor was Khadr an Afghan national,
forced by more powerful actors in his native land to enlist.
As Canadian nationals, he and his family had traveled
75
thousands of miles to assist Al Qaeda's inner circle.'
Indeed, as a Canadian national, Khadr could have
surrendered at any time to the Canadian forces that formed
part of the alliance seeking to dislodge Al Qaeda and the
Taliban. Whether or not Khadr is guilty of a war crime, the
child soldier argument always seemed like an attempt to fit
171. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2006, supra note 64. A judge had
already ruled in 2005 that Khadr's conditions as of that time did not warrant
entry of an injunction barring further interrogation, regardless of abuse that
may have occurred earlier. See O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005).
172. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
May 2"5, 2000, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/595?OpenDocument [hereinafter
Optional Protocol]; cf. Suzanne Farley, Comment, Juvenile Enemy Combatants
and the Juvenile Death Penalty in U.S. Military Commissions, 47 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 829 (2007).
173. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 65 (acknowledging that
international law permits the prosecution of minors for war crimes). Khadr's
lawyers need not invoke the conspiracy theory discussed in the text to mount a
factual defense. A recently unearthed military document indicates that another
individual was alive at the compound when the American soldier came on the
scene. This individual, who was killed by American fire shortly thereafter, could
also conceivably have thrown the grenade that cost Sgt. Speer his life. See
SHEPHARD, supra note 140, at 224-25. The military document makes Kuebler's
pushing of the conspiracy theory gratuitous, as well as unsupported by evidence.
174. See

SHEPHARD,

supra note 140, at 81-82.

175. Id. at 75-80 (discussing Khadr family's sheltering of the family Dr.
Ayman Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's second-in-command, in the months after
September 11).
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stubborn facts into a category that would not accommodate
them.
The time-consuming commitment to these futile
strategies may have generated significant opportunity costs.
One possible opportunity cost here was neglect of a
traditional
criminal
defense
strategy:
cooperation.
Cooperating with the government helps the detainee for two
reasons: first, it leverages a useful bargaining tool possessed
by the detainee: information. Second, cooperation bonds the
detainee to the government, demonstrating that the
cooperating defendant has both ethical and practical
incentives to avoid back-sliding into terrorist activity.176 We
may never know whether Khadr would have considered this
option, or whether Khadr's attorneys made such a proffer to
the government. However, it is sobering to compare the
meager results yielded by the lawyers' international turn
with the superior track record of detainees who chose to
plead and/or cooperate, including David Hicks, who was
transferred to Australian custody immediately after his deal
and released by Australian authorities months later, and
Salim Hamdan, whose cooperation clearly figured in the 5 1A
year sentence (including 5 years of time served) that he
recently received after being convicted in a military tribunal
of assisting Al Qaeda.177 Indeed, Abdurahman, one of
Khadr's
brothers,
also
cooperated,
and
received
substantially better treatment as a result.178 Moreover,
Omar may have been able to offer information about his
other brother Abdullah, whom the United States had
charged with assisting terrorism and was seeking to
extradite from Canada. 179 The forays into international
forums of Khadr's lawyers seem quixotic in comparison.
Of course, sometimes inconvenient facts, obstinate
clients, and an unreceptive government make quixotic
ventures the defense lawyer's lot. Khadr's lawyers1s 0
176. See Richman, supra note 24; Simons, supranote 24.
177. See Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to Short Term, supra
note 98.
178. See SHEPHARD, supranote 140, at 141-44.
179. See id. at 211.
180. I should disclose that Khadr's former lawyers, Muneer Ahmad and Rick
Wilson of American University's Washington College of Law, are friends, and
that Ahmad participated in a conference I helped coordinate last year on law
and terrorism.
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deserve praise if they pulled out all the stops to sell both
their client and the government on a package deal that
leveraged concern for their client's youth with a proffer of
cooperation. While the legal and political case for child
soldier status was not strong enough on its own, it was
plausible to think that it may have moved the government
in combination with an offer to cooperate. Lawyers who
resort to the international gambit should be willing to
aggressively counsel the client to sign off on such a package.
If they fail to do so, they should expect that a client like
Khadr will become disillusioned with representation once
the brass bands of international tribunals fade.181
D. Summary
In sum, asymmetrical accountability mechanisms can
be a siren song for advocates. They make crossover venues
such as media interaction and international forums
appealing in the short term. In the longer term, however,
the lack of both discipline for advocates and concrete results
for clients can render crossover advocacy either futile or
counterproductive.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, ROLE, AND RHETORIC

In addition to costs prompted by asymmetrical
accountability mechanisms, crossover lawyering is plagued
by conflicts of interest, role, and rhetoric. No legal system is
immune from such tensions. However, crossover advocacy
may be particularly susceptible. As with the asymmetrical
accountability mechanisms discussed above, such conflicts
yield costs to clients, the learned professions, and the public
interest.
A. Conflicts of Interest
Crossover advocacy can trigger conflicts of interest that
undermine the lawyer's loyalty to a client. Model Rule 1.7
181. Khadr ultimately fired his American civilian lawyers, Ahmad and
Wilson, although this result may well have stemmed as much from the burdens
imposed by Guantanamo authorities on detainees visited by lawyers as it did
from the lack of progress in his case. See SHEPHARD, supra note 140, at 175-76
(noting how detainees were taken from their cells in shackles to meet their
attorneys).
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regulates conflicts that occur when the lawyer's ability to
represent a client is "materially limited" by obligations to
8 2 Conflicts of interest increase when lawyers face
others.1
financial or ideological temptations to ignore divided
loyalties.
Consider a criminal defense lawyer paid by the alleged
kingpin of an organized crime syndicate to represent a
"soldier" in the group. The lawyer may have an incentive to
counsel the client to avoid "flipping" on the kingpin, who
after all pays the lawyer's bills.183 In politically charged
cases, the lawyer eager to cultivate a high profile or control
strategy may also ignore potential conflicts of interest.184
Crossover advocacy can yield the worst of both worlds:
conflicts generated when the lawyer is retained or paid by
someone other than the client, and exacerbated because of
the high-profile nature of the representation. The possibility
of conflicts can be especially greater when lawyers from the
detainee's country of origin become involved. These lawyers
may have a primary loyalty to those who brought them into
the case--often the detainee's family-and not to the best
interests of the detainee.

182. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2009). Lawyers faced
with conflicts must determine if they can represent the client with appropriate
vigor. If the answer is "yes," the lawyer must procure the client's informed
consent. Lawyers who do not seek or secure the client's consent, or who confront
a conflict too stark to be waivable, must withdraw.
183. See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (disqualifying
defense counsel who represented both individual police officer charged with
mistreating a suspect in custody, whose best defense involved accusing another
police officer of responsibility for acts alleged, and police officers' union, which
had interest in avoiding charges against other officers); Bruce A. Green,
"Through a Glass, Darkly" How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal
Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1227 n.116 (1989); Peter Margulies,
Lawyers' Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate
Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 962
(2006); Richman, supra note 24; Simons, Retribution for Rats, supra note 24;
Simons, Vicarious Snitching, supranote 24; Weinstein, supranote 24.
184. See United States v. Abdel Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 266, 270-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (describing conflicts of interest caused by radical lawyer William
Kunstler's background of representing multiple defendants accused in terrorism
trial). But see Margulies, supra note 183, at 965-66 (criticizing decision in Abdel
Rahman on grounds that defendant's view that Kunstler was uniquely suited to
represent him at trial was reasonable and should have outweighed conflicts
cited by court).
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Here, as elsewhere, the Omar Khadr case is instructive.
Khadr's family has a deep background of collaboration with
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda higher ups, documented5
amply even in sources sympathetic to Omar Khadr.8
Moreover, one of Khadr's brothers is fighting extradition to
the United States, where he is charged with providing
material support to Al Qaeda.SS One of Khadr's Canadian
lawyers, Dennis Edney, represents Omar's brother.187
Omar's military lawyer, William Kuebler, views Edney as
having a conflict of interest, particularly since Omar might
be able to secure a deal by flipping on his brother. That
Khadr might not ultimately wish to do this is irrelevant.
The conflict of interest arises because Edney cannot even
raise the possibility without violating his duty of loyalty to
Abdullah.18 8 Edney cannot therefore fulfill his duty to
provide Omar with independent advice.
B. Conflicts of role
Crossover advocacy can also breed conflicts of role. In
some cases, disputes among separate counsel for a client
can fragment representation, and displace authority to hire
and fire lawyers usually held by the client. In other cases,
advocates who have day-jobs as academics are caught
between the disinterested analysis required in scholarly
endeavors and the ubiquitous pressure on advocates to score
points for a client or cause. Each kind of role conflict
sacrifices crucial values on the altar of expedience.
1. Conflicts Between Counsel. Conflicts among counsel
that are endemic to any representation can become more
bitter in the detainee representation context because of the
interaction of the two factors cited above: the high-profile
185. See SHEPHARD, supra note 140, at 61 (noting that in 1996 Omar Khadr's
father and his wife "were delighted bin Laden and his followers were back in
Afghanistan" and soon moved to a spot near bin Laden's compound, making
regular trips there).
186. Id. at 207.
187. Id. at 211.
188. See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002). But see
Williams v. Meachum, 948 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant
could waive conflict of interest created because his lawyer also represented
another individual who would be identified if current client mounted a "lookalike" defense).
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nature of the representation and the inaccessibility of
clients. Advocates have even more incentive to fight
amongst themselves, without the client being able to serve
as an effective referee.'8 9 In cross-over advocacy, the highprofile nature of the cases can promote such conflicts.
In Omar Khadr's case, for example, when Lt. Cmdr.
Kuebler went to Canada and met with leaders of the
opposition parties, Khadr's Canadian lawyer Edney
resented Kuebler's referring to himself as 'lead counsel." In
response,
Edney
linked Kuebler
and the
Bush
administration, complaining, "Here we have Canadian
politicians choosing to speak to an American military
lawyer who is not Omar's chosen lawyer . . . and who was
appointed by the same U.S. authority that gave us
Guantanamo and all its horrors."190 Edney's jibe was
particularly jarring because of Kuebler's demonstrated
eagerness to offend the sensibilities of United States
officials. 19 However, when high-profile advocacy with the
press and politicians is the lawyer's stock-in-trade, such
conflicts among counsel are far more difficult to avoid.
As problematic as Edney's conduct may be, Kuebler's
response was equally disturbing. On the occasion of this
professional spat, Kuebler used the leverage that the
military commission gives to JAG lawyers to bar Edney
from seeing Khadr.192 Kuebler had no authority under the
state ethical rules that govern lawyers to make this call.
Generally, the client controls choice of counsel.193 When
conflicts vitiate the client's choice, the court will be the
arbiter-not the lawyer's co-counsel. A defense lawyer
should not assume a prerogative that rightfully belongs to
his client and to the court. Here, again, however, the
189. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy

Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (noting importance of consultation
with client).
190. See

SHEPHARD,

supra note 140, at 217.

191. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing Kuebler's
circulation of conspiracy theory involving Khadr's alleged victim).
192. See

SHEPHARD, supra note 140, at 217-18.
193. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1988)
(acknowledging importance of client's prerogative, while holding that court may
intervene to prevent irreconcilable conflicts of interest that would undermine
effective defense). But cf. Green, supra note 183 (arguing that Court in Wheat
was too willing to second-guess client's choice).
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inaccessibility of clients and the high profile of cases
presents temptations that are difficult to avoid.
2. Conflicts Between the Roles of Scholar and Advocate.
Conflicts of role are also troublesome for advocates who
double as scholars. Scholars have an obligation to address
competing positions and explain facts that appear to
contradict their thesis. A scholar should be "disinterested
and [advocate for] what she genuinely believes to be the
best answer to the question.194 Litigators-even public
interest litigators for whom pecuniary gain is manifestly not
the guiding objective-pursue strategic calculation to
maximize a client's advantage.195 A litigator is not required
to, and indeed may be prohibited from, arguing her "best
view" of the law in a case when such an argument would
harm her client.
However, this contrast of ideal types masks a
countervailing tension in practice. While openness to
differing arguments is a scholarly virtue,196 academics may
lock themselves into a theory that fails to take opposing
considerations into account. 197 After all, nothing spoils a
good theory more than messy facts. Lawyers, in contrast,
must be open to changing their theory of the case, if change
would help their client.198 The result can be a double dose of
194. See William Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1555,
1576 (2008). While this subsection points out tensions between the roles of
scholar and advocate, I recognize that academics serve a profoundly valuable
function in public interest law, and should be commended for both work on
behalf of a party and work for amici curiae. History is replete with illustrations,
including Felix Frankfurter's advocacy for the labor movement and Sacco and
Vanzetti, and Anthony Amsterdam's legal work opposing the death penalty and
on the Guantanamo cases. Amsterdam and others mentioned here, including
clinical law professors such as Muneer Ahmad, Mark Denbeaux, Joe Margulies,
Martha Rayner, and Rick Wilson, and doctrinal faculty such as Neal Katyal and
Jenny Martinez, have served capably, although tensions in role are in my view
evident in the work of some of those mentioned.
195. See Simon, supra note 194, at 1576.
196. Id. (noting that academics should practice "openness and the
continuous exchange of views among different perspectives" and embrace the
premise that "willingness to reconsider one's views [is] . . . a sign of selfconfidence and integrity").
197. See Margulies, supranote 26.
198. Of course, this commitment to change on a client's behalf is sometimes
honored more in the breach, particularly for cause lawyers who lack
commitment to individual clients. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
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role confusion for academics who litigate. 199 The academic
lawyer may permit her advocacy of a legal position to spill
over into scholarly work, muting the discussion of opposing
arguments necessary for scholarly analysis. On the other
hand, the scholar committed to a theory may shirk the
advocate's obligation to temper any theory when the client's
interests so dictate.
a. Role Conflicts and the Temptations of Agenda-Driven
Empiricism. Role conflicts also undermine detainee
advocates' empirical work. Two detainee advocates whose
legal work has been exemplary have crossed over into the
realm of empiricism, authoring a study of detainee
characteristics 200 that seeks to impeach the outlandish
claims made by the Bush administration that detainees
uniformly represent the "worst of the worst."201 In response,
the study pushes the misadventure narrative, arguing that
most detainees were in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Unfortunately, the authors' selective use of statistics and
sources fails standards for objective empirical work. These
flaws also undermine the authors' advocacy position.
The detainee study's flaws have their roots in a latent
conflict in advocates' rhetoric. Detainee advocates have
rightly criticized the CSRTs at Guantanamo for a lack of
procedural safeguards. 202 For the most part, the

Class Actions, 34
into this category.

STAN.

L. REV. 1183 (1982). Academic lawyers sometimes fit

199. See Simon, supranote 194, at 1576.
200. See DETAINEE

STUDY,

supra note 25.

201. See Lithwick, supranote 16.
202. As the previous subsection dealing with Hamdan's case demonstrates, I
follow the lead of a number of courts in distinguishing between three forums:
the pre-MCA military commissions, post-MCA military commissions, and
CSRTs. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that
Congress could not preclude habeas corpus petitions for detainees because
CSRTs did not have procedural safeguards that would allow them to serve as an
adequate substitute for habeas), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
(holding that President Bush lacked authority to unilaterally establish military
commissions), with Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132-33, 137 (D.D.C.
2008) (holding that military commissions authorized by Congress under
Military Commissions Act had sufficient procedural safeguards to warrant
abstention from federal court intervention). Courts have held that the first and
third forums lack basic procedural guarantees. In contrast, courts have
permitted proceedings in the second forum-post-MCA military commissionsto proceed subject to judicial review, in part because these proceedings possess
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misadventure narrative fits well with the detainee lawyers'
quest for more rigorous processes. Moreover, despite the
hyperbole of the Bush administration, the misadventure
story is often accurate. On occasion, however, events
challenge this convenient dovetailing of innocence and
process rhetoric.
In one recent case, a released Kuwaiti detainee named
Abdallah Salih al-Ajmi who had earlier fought with the
Taliban blew himself up in northern Iraq in a suicide
2 3 Of
bombing that killed members of Iraq's security forces.
course, false negatives are inevitable in any process where
adjudication is fair. However, a subtle but striking conflict
in rhetoric emerged in the rationalization offered by the
suicide bomber's former lawyer, Tom Wilner. Wilner
impliedly conceded ground on innocence, since the "wrong
place at the wrong time" narrative did not fit well for a
suicide bomber. 20 4 Denied ready use of the misadventure
story, Wilner relied on the process narrative, arguing that
more robust procedural safeguards would have caught false
negatives, as well as false positives.25 While this point has
an intuitive appeal, its merits turn on the implicit

indicia of fundamental fairness such as the right to procure and present
exculpatory evidence.
203. See Josh White, Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Joined Iraq Suicide Attack,
WASH. POST, May 8, 2008, at A18.
204. Wilner did capture some of the irrationality of release decisions, which
can be capricious, leading to "innocent people being held unfairly and not-soinnocent people going home." Id. Wilner also argued that al-Ajmi's treatment at
Guantanamo, which included altercations with guards, may have played a role
in his post-release conduct. Id. However, al-Ajmi's move from Kuwait to
Afghanistan to join the Taliban prior to his detention indicates he may have
been predisposed to take such action.
205. Id. While al-Ajmi can appropriately be classified as a false negative, the
government's claims of substantial recidivism among released detainees may
well be exaggerated. See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE MEANING OF
"BATTLEFIELD": AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATIONS OF
"BATTLEFIELD" CAPTURE AND "RECIDMvSM" OF THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES,

available at http://law.shu.edu/news/meaning-ofibattlefield-final 121007.pdf
(last visited Aug. 27, 2008) (arguing that the government's list of recidivists
covers not only released detainees who have allegedly engaged in violence but
also those like the Uighurs, who are Chinese nationals (and ethnic Turks) resettled in Albania). The re-settled Uighurs have merely criticized the United
States, which should not land them on a list of recidivists.) Id. at 5, 9-10.
However, even the authors of the study, which predates the al-Ajmi episode,
concede that some recidivists have surfaced. Id. at 11-13.
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recognition that the misadventure narrative is sometimes
too good to be true.
Indeed, a careful look at the results of the detainee
advocates' principal study together with the results of a
of tribunal
empirical
examination
more
neutral
transcripts 206 illustrates the advocates' dilemma. The
neutral study demonstrates that in a significant portion of
the CSRT and ARB cases, undisputed evidence undercuts
the misadventure narrative. Specifically, in about one-third
of the cases where CSRTs found that detainees remained
dangerous, detainees either admitted their involvement in
Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other terrorist groups in detailed
statements, or else admitted facts indicating that they had
committed hostile acts or had participated in Taliban or Al
20 7
Qaeda facilities such as safehouses and training camps.
In one case, for example, a detainee testified to the CSRT
that he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban in
compliance with a fatwah from a Saudi cleric. 20 8 While one
might argue that this person was at best a foot-soldier
whom it would be safe to release, the example of Wilner's
a suicide bombing after release
client who engaged in
20 9
should give one pause.
In contrast, although the rhetoric of the detainee
advocates' study stresses the misadventure narrative, 210 the
study's results illustrate the limitations of that claim. For
example, the study's authors lead off their findings with the
announcement that the government has charged that only
eight percent of detainees were Al Qaeda fighters. 211 It then
206. See WITTES, supra note 50.
207. Id. at 86-87.
208. Id. at 89.
209. Moreover, whatever the prudential factors favoring release, it seems
absolutely clear that the Afghan government would have been able under the
Geneva Convention to hold this detainee as a prisoner of war pending a
resolution of the ongoing conflict with the Taliban. Id. at 92.
210. See DETAINEE

STUDY,

supranote 25, at 2.

211. Id. The authors have produced a valuable work on the procedural

limitations of the CSRTs. See

DENBEAUX

& DENBEAUX, supra note 49. The CSRT

study addresses procedural fairness, an area where lawyers tend to have
greater expertise. The value of the CSRT study therefore does not hinge on
quantitative analysis of the evidence against detainees, where the authors'
Detainee Study runs into trouble. Similarly, the authors' study of the
government's recidivism claims, see DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 205, focuses on
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informs the reader that of the remaining number of
detainees, eighteen percent had no affiliation with either Al
Qaeda or the Taliban. This rhetorical frame 212 seems to
favor the misadventure narrative, but flipping the
percentages tells a different story: According to the
government, fully eighty-two percent of the
remaining
detainees had ties to Al Qaeda or the Taliban.213
The rest of the authors' discussion of detainees' Taliban
involvement oscillates between non sequitur and selective
sourcing. Instead of focusing as the more neutral study does
on the details of the detainees' admissions, the advocates
casually observe that the detainees "seem to be people not
responsible for actually running the country.214 Even if the

advocates provided empirical backing for that claim,
however, this observation would be beside the point. While
the United States has a compelling interest in
apprehending senior Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership,
effective antiterrorism policy requires deterring operatives
further down the food chain. 215
anecdotes and concedes the government's case on a number of examples.
Moreover, its most convincing counter-example rests on a group of released
detainees, the Uighurs, whose grievance lies with the Chinese government and
who therefore are not a reliable placeholder for the vast majority of
Guantanamo detainees. See supra note 205 (discussing the Uighurs); cf. Parhat
v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the government has
not met its burden under the Military Commissions Act of demonstrating that
Uighurs still detained at Guantanamo have hostile intentions toward the
United States).
The Uighurs's plight demonstrates the difficulties that will confront a new
administration intent on emptying Guantanamo. The government concedes that
the Uighurs have a legitimate fear of persecution or torture if they are returned
to China. However, other countries are reluctant to accept them. United States
efforts have resulted in placement of a number of detainees in Albania, but this
arrangement has been far from optimal. See Jonathan Finer, After
Guantanamo,An Empty Freedom;Ethnic Uighurs Frustratedin Albania, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2007, at A13 (describing Uighurs's discontent with delays in
reunion with family members and other factors).
212. See Painter, supra note 116, at 1413-18 (noting how framing effects
distort deliberation and analysis).
213. This number rises to 83.5% if one includes the eight percent of total
detainees whom the government charges were Al Qaeda fighters. See DETAINEE
STUDY, supra note 25, at 2.
214. Id. at 16.
215. See Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting that Congress, in passing the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §§
2331-38 (2006), which provides for civil liability for those who commit terrorist
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The authors also manipulate secondary sources and
data samples in asserting that "many" of the accused
Taliban detainees were conscripts. 216 To analyze the
conscription issue accurately, one must consider two groups:
Afghanis and foreign fighters. The secondary source the
authors cite acknowledges that the Taliban drafted
numbers of Afghanis. 217 However, the authors fail to disclose
that the same source on the same page indicates that the8
Taliban also utilized large numbers of foreign fighters.21
Since non-Afghani Taliban members are unlikely to be
conscripts, the authors' conscription point simply does not
apply to this group. Indeed, according to data available to
but not cited by the authors, the "many" Taliban conscripts
they claim amount to a mere thirteen individuals out of the
scores of admitted Taliban
members who have been
29
detained at Guantanamo. 1
The authors' non sequiturs and selective sourcing stem
from the temporal discounting deficit that plagues crossover
advocates. In seeking to rebut administration officials'
extreme claims, the advocates have carved out an
unsustainable position of their own. The ubiquitous pie
charts that populate the advocates' study may impress
readers in the short run. 220 However, public and elite
acts, enacted the ATA as a civil remedy designed to impose liability "at any
point along the causal chain of terrorism" including the provision of financial
and other assistance) (citing S. REP. No. 102-342, at 26 (1992) (Leg. Hist.)),
availableat 1992 WL 187372.
216. See DETAINEE STUDY, supra note 25, at 16.
217. See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 100 (2000), cited in DETAINEE STUDY, supra
note 25, at 16.
218. See id at 100; cf. id. at 133-40 (discussing foreign fighters in Taliban);
Milton Bearden, Graveyard of Empires: Afghanistan's Treacherous Peaks, in
How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR 83, 92-93 (James F. Hoge,
Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001); Thomas Hegghammer, TerroristRecruitment and
Radicalization in Saudi Arabia, 8 MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 38, 39 (Winter 2006);
Lawrence Wright, The Man Behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian Doctor Became
a Master of Terror,NEW YORKER, Sept. 16, 2002, at 56 (discussing background of
Al Qaeda leadership and recruits);
219. See WITTES, supra note 50, at 86.
220. Indeed, the pie charts and misleading statistics of the detainee
advocates' study may mask some common ground, as the study's authors admit
in passing that the government has reliable evidence for "some of the
detainees." DETAINEE

STUDY,

supra note 25, at 15.
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opinion will eventually tire of this gamesmanship, eroding
support for robust procedures which all should agree are
crucial. Crossing over from advocacy to empirical work, the
detainee advocates have failed at both.221
The authors' most recent report also cites copious statistics on detainee
releases while offering a highly selective view of the facts. See MARK DENBEAUX,
JOSHUA DENBEAUX & R. DAVID GRATZ, PROFILES OF RELEASED GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT'S STORY THEN AND Now (2008), http://law.shu.edu/
center policyresearch/reports/detainees thenandnow_final.pdf [hereinafter
PROFILES STUDY]. The authors note correctly that the government's release of
detainees from Guantanamo does not appear to correlate with the nature of the
detainees' alleged involvement with Al Qaeda. See id. at 2. The authors assert
that the government makes release decisions based on the nationality of the
detainees. Id. at 19-26. However, this assertion obscures far more than it
enlightens. Delays in release have been most significant for three countries:
China, Algeria, and Yemen. See id. at 23-25. The authors do not disclose that
these delays stem from two factors: (1) the government's compliance with the
provisions of the Convention Against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, art. 1,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10 1984)
[hereinafter CAT], and (2) the Yemeni government's poor track record in
detaining convicted terrorists. The government has declined to repatriate any
Chinese nationals and many Algerian nationals because of concerns that the
detainees risk torture upon their return to their country of origin. See Belbacha
v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting Algerian detainee's fear of
torture); Del Quentin Wilber, Chinese Detainees' Release is Blocked; Justice
Dept. Seeks More Time for Appeal, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2008, at A3 (noting
Chinese detainees' fear of torture). Yemen's government, which has tried to
mediate between the demand of the United States for vigorous counterterrorism
measures and the support for terrorists among key constituencies that keep the
government in power, has repeatedly permitted terrorists to escape from
confinement. See Robert F. Worth, Wanted by F.B.I., but Walking Out of a
Yemen Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A3 (noting convicted terrorist's
casual exit from court hearing because of arrangement with Yemeni
government). The new administration will have to deal with these complex
factors, but the authors of the study provide no help, preferring to play a game
of "gotcha" with outgoing Bush officials.
221. Of course, the detainee advocates are neither the first nor the last to
attempt to use faulty empiricism for advocacy objectives. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing standards for admission of
scientific evidence); see also Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, What's
the Law to Do?: The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay
and Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847, 852-54 (2008) (discussing
pervasiveness of methodological problems in empirical and scientific work
generated by advocacy efforts).
Role conflicts have also afflicted scholars who served as advocates for
detainees before the Supreme Court. For example, Jenny Martinez of Stanford,
who represented Jose Padilla before the Supreme Court, has recently argued
that the Court engaged in a troubling form of avoidance by declining to hear
Padilla's habeas petition because it had been filed in a court lacking jurisdiction
over Padilla's immediate custodian. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
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b. Using Litigation to Settle Ideological Scores: The
Lawsuit Against John Yoo. Role conflicts are even more
evident in the lawsuit against John Yoo in which the Yale
Project represents Jose Padilla. The lawsuit seeks to impose
tort liability on Yoo, a Berkeley law professor who as a
(2004); see also Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 617 (1961) (announcing
immediate custodian rule); cf. Martinez, supra note 4, at 1035-39 (criticizing
Court). Padilla's lawyers, faced with the challenge of contesting the detention
without clear statutory authorization of an American citizen, understandably
preferred litigating in the Second Circuit, where Padilla was initially detained,
to the more conservative Fourth Circuit, where Padilla was detained for much of
the time. Martinez criticized the Court's decision on habeas jurisdiction without
acknowledging that Padilla's lawyers could have readily addressed the
procedural issue by litigating the case in the Fourth Circuit. This strategy
would have ensured that the Supreme Court consider the substantive issues
that Padilla had raised. Moreover, Martinez's article failed to cite the Court's
earlier decision in Carbo,which should have been a red flag for Padilla's lawyers
that litigating the procedural issue would ensnare their client in a procedural
thicket.
In another recent example, Neal Katyal of Georgetown undermined
arguments based on the "passive virtues" that he had successfully made to the
Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that
President Bush lacked authority to unilaterally establish military commissions).
Cf. Katyal, supra note 4, at 92-93; Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword to The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961). But see Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 110, at 1041-43 (suggesting that passive virtues may be
overrated, at least when showdown now will minimize decision costs later). In
the summer of 2008, Katyal sought an injunction against Hamdan's pending
military commission trial. He did so even though Congress had addressed the
lack of specific authorization and procedural safeguards that had led Katyal to
label the military commissions unilaterally authorized by President Bush as a
"dangerous experiment" frowned on by Bickelian prudence. See Petition for
Certiorari at 30, Hamdan, [hereinafter Cert. Petition], available at http://www.
law.georgetown.edulfaculty/nkk/documents/8-7-05_CertPetition.nkll.pdf.
The
district court denied the request for an injunction. See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F.
Supp. 2d 130, 132-33, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that "Article III judges do
not have a monopoly on justice, or on constitutional learning," after noting that
the military commissions authorized by Congress requires that the accused be
present for his hearing, permits the accused to obtain and present exculpatory
evidence, and includes three levels of appellate review, including review by the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court); see also William Glaberson, Terror Trial
Nears End As Defense Rests Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at A9 (reporting
that Hamdan in his trial was able to offer exculpatory evidence, including
statements from Al Qaeda higher-ups like Khalid Shaikh Mohamed (KSM)
suggesting that Hamdan was a low-level player in the organization); Glaberson,
supra note 98 (reporting that jury sentenced Hamdan to five-and-one-half years
including time served, which could result in Hamdan's release in months). After
the changes noted by the court in Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. at 132-33, the
passive virtues argument stressed in Katyal's scholarship evaporated, leaving
strategic calculation as the basis for his request.
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government lawyer offered infamous and substantively
222
shaky legal advice on interrogation of terror suspects.
According to the complaint, by providing legal advice, Yoo
was responsible for harsh treatment that Padilla
experienced while in detention. Viewed broadly, the Yale
Project's advocacy is an acknowledgment that law schools
have a significant role to play in educating students about
the shortcomings of Yoo's work. However, performing that
role requires a commitment to the virtues of consistency,
clarity, and concreteness. Sadly, the Yale Project's pleadings
display none of these attributes.
The Yale Project's pleadings seek to force-fit Yoo's
problematic legal opinion into facts that the opinion, for all
of its severe flaws, does not contemplate or address. Yoo's
opinion makes indefensible arguments about the scope of
presidential authority, and also employs strained analogies
to irrelevant sources of authority. However, it includes one
hard limitation: geography. Yoo's advice, issued under the
name of then Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee,
discussed only treatment of detainees outside the United
States.223 The government at all times detained Padilla
within the United States. The Yale Project's pleadings fail
to recognize that Yoo's advice therefore excludes Padilla by
its terms.
Second, the Yale Project pleadings actually undercut
the core criticism of the Bybee Memo as a legal fig-leaf
providing cover for abusive interrogations. To serve this
purpose, the legal opinion must clearly authorize all of the
measures that officials ordering the interrogations sought to
implement. 224 However, the Yale Project's pleadings do not
222. See FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & Aziz Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 187-99 (2007); Kathleen
Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. & POLY 455 (2005); Gillers, supra note 26; George C. Harris, The Rule of Law
and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch
Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 409 (2005); Luban,
supra note 26; Margulies, supra note 26; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80-85 (2005); W.
Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167

(2005).
223. See Bybee Memo, supra note 61 (limiting advice to "conduct of
interrogations outside of the United States"). A more recent memo by Yoo
contained the same territorial limitation. See Yoo Memo, supranote 61.
224. An ambiguous or equivocal opinion suggests the need for caution, and
therefore does not provide a safe harbor for aggressive tactics.
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allege this congruency between legal advice and conduct.
Indeed, deconstructing the pleadings' amorphous syntax
yields a conclusion that cuts against Yoo's liability. The
pleadings contend that the harm suffered by Padilla while
in detention flowed from "a deliberate unwritten
understanding" 225 and a "climate"226 "fostered by the
promulgation of [Yoo's] memoranda." 227 Common sense
suggests that a supposedly authoritative opinion that
merely "foster[s]" an "unwritten understanding" is not very
authoritative at all, and therefore fails abjectly as a fig-leaf.
Ironically, the internal inconsistencies and amorphous
language of the Yale Project's pleadings appear to let Yoo off
the hook.
In another non sequitur, the Yale Project's pleadings
claim that Yoo should be liable for use of the few techniques
that his narrow advice clearly bars. The pleadings allege
that Yoo authorized or at least "fostered" "imminent"
threats to Padilla's life and health, as well as the life and
health of Padilla's family. 228 We have already discussed how
the amorphous connotation of the term "fostered" actually
undercuts the complaint's theory of liability regarding Yoo's
legal advice. 229 However, the complaint cannot use a more
concrete term to tie imminent death threats against Padilla
230
to Yoo, since Yoo's advice clearly prohibited such threats.

225. See Padilla Complaint, supra note 5, at para. 63.
226. Id. at para. 104.
227. Id. at para. 63. The Yale Project filed an amended complaint on
Padilla's behalf in June 2008 that echoes these problems. See Padilla v. Yoo,
First Amended Complaint, No. 3:08-cv-00035-JSW (N.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint] (copy on file with the author). The amended complaint
omitted the charge that Yoo "fostered" a "climate." However, it included claims
that Yoo's memos "encouraged aggressive interrogation," see Amended
Complaint para. 32, and gave a "green light" to such tactics. Id. at para. 47.
These terms are as vague as the language they replaced.
228. Padilla Complaint, supra note 5, at para. 57.
229. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
230. See Bybee Memo, supra note 61, at 182 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C)
(2000) and advising that threats of "imminent death" are expressly prohibited).
Yoo did provide interrogators with some room on this point, since he authorized
threats that were hypothetical and contingent, "referring vaguely to things that
might happen in the future." Id. However, the Padilla Complaint did not allege
that interrogators made threats of this kind to Padilla. It alleges only
"imminent" threats, which Yoo clearly advised were illegal.
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Yoo's opinion also clearly barred threats the
interrogators allegedly made to cut Padilla with a knife and
pour alcohol into the wounds.231 Yoo pegged the definition of
torture to harm that would constitute an emergency medical
condition requiring a hospital to provide treatment. 232 While
commentators have rightly criticized the narrowness of
Yoo's definition and his strained analogy to health care
statutes, 233 a knife wound would clearly meet even this
painfully circumscribed standard. Here, too, the complaint
undermines the theory of liability that it purports to
advance.
If one looks beyond the surface of the Yale Project's
pleadings, however, one finds a more ominous iteration of
the temporal discounting deficit. The complaint's drafters
understand the objections made above, which is why they
alleged that Yoo's advice merely "fostered" the conduct
alleged. In the short run, claiming that Yoo fostered harm to
detainees patches over fatal flaws in the complaint. A
longer-term perspective, however, reveals deeper problems
with the complaint's lack of concreteness. 234

Yoo also opined that the interrogator needed to make threats or commit
other harm with the specific intent to cause pain to the subject. Bybee Memo,
supra note 61, at 174-75. However, Yoo noted that a jury can consider context,
including the probability that the detainee will experience pain, as evidence of
specific intent. Id. at 175 ("[A]s a matter of practice in the federal criminal
justice system it is highly unlikely that a jury would acquit in such a situation.
Where a defendant holds an unreasonable belief, he will confront the problem of
proving to a jury that he actually held that belief."). Yoo's March 2003 opinion
contains virtually identical language. See Yoo Memo, supra note 61, at 30
("[S]pecific intent... can be inferred from the factual circumstances."). Because
of this caveat, Yoo's advice on specific intent also could not have served as a fig
leaf for interrogators.
231. See Padilla Complaint, supra note 5, at para. 50(b).
232. See Bybee Memo, supra note 6, at 176 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (2000)).
233. See Clark, supra note 222; Margulies, supra note 26; cf. Norman W.
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1975-76 (2008) (arguing that the manifest failings of Yoo's
legal advice did not stem from eagerness to please superiors or failure to take a
moral stand, but rather from Yoo's misguided zeal to create a new legal
approach for dealing with genuine threats).
234. The one dollar of damages sought by Padilla highlights the lack of
concreteness in the complaint, instilling the impression that the lawsuit is more
about proving a point than about either compensation or deterrence.
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Lawyers in a democracy should question attempts to tie
legal liability to vague claims that individuals have
"fostered" adverse consequences. American history is replete
with amorphous doctrines-such as the now discredited
"bad tendency" test for limiting speech 235-that allowed
government to target individuals. Given Yoo's poor legal
advice, it may seem fitting in the short term to apply such
an indefinite standard to him. Courts repudiated the "bad
tendency" test precisely because what seems convenient or
fitting in the short term can have dangerous long-term
effects. At the very least, the Yale Project drafters had an
obligation to deliberate about the trade-offs reflected in
their pleadings. Unfortunately, the fuzzy language and logic
offer abundant evidence of deliberation's
of the complaint
236
absence.
V. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CROSSOVER ADVOCACY

Crossover advocacy also can entail a failure to
adequately address the complexities of legal transitions.
Players in legal disputes form a fluid environment in which
unpredictable consequences abound. 237 Crossover advocacy
can boomerang, as legal innovations designed to help clients
are transformed and adopted by opponents. Advocacy efforts
can also result in an adversary's exit to a more receptive
realm where advocates have less leverage. In addition,
crossover advocacy can trigger a backlash which hurts the
cause that advocates are promoting.

235.

GEOFFREY

R.

STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM

(2004) (discussing
courts' rationale for upholding government targeting of dissenters after
America's involvement in World War 1) (citing Shaffer v. United States, 255 F.
886, 887-89 (9th Cir. 1919)).
236. The Yale Project has done other exemplary work, including filing an
amicus brief arguing for limits on the government's ability to detain people
within the United States. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir.
2008).
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 171

237. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 195 (describing then-President-elect
Clinton's about-face on Haitian refugees).
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A. Substantive Boomerang Effects
Boomerang effects are a fixture of the advocacy
landscape. Once advocates introduce a theory, they lose
control over its use. The theory becomes a weapon that
opponents can wield against the advocates' cause or allies.
As a case in point, consider the argument for formal
racial equality made by the NAACP lawyers who brought
the landmark desegregation cases of the twentieth century.
In arguing against the evil of de jure segregation, these
advocates insisted that the Constitution was "color-blind."238
Civil rights leaders like the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.
refined the concept, envisioning a world where people would
be judged by the "content of their character," not their race.
While this powerful rhetoric accomplished much, it also
opened up a line of attack for opponents of affirmative
action to exploit.
One example from the terrorism context is the use of
theories of aiding and abetting liability for damage actions.
Plaintiffs advanced a theory of aiding and abetting liability
in extraordinary rendition cases, where plaintiffs have
alleged that they were delivered to foreign countries for the
purpose of torture. 239 Aiding and abetting liability is also an
important plaintiffs' argument in the lawsuit against John
Yoo. The theory has also figured in other human rights
contexts, for example, in cases alleging that corporations
doing business abroad should be answerable under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).240 In some cases, this kind of
litigation will discover an actionable pattern of collusion
between a despotic government and corporations that use
238. Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences,
2007 WIs. L. REV. 239, 261-64 (arguing that rhetoric of landmark civil rights
decisions allowed courts to decline to remedy social, political, and economic
harms, which courts viewed as "color-blind," i.e., not based on race).
239. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sack, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (repeating appellant's allegation that
United States officials aided and abetted alleged torture committed by Syrian
authorities by rendering him to Syria).
240. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
Victims of terrorist attacks have also sought to invoke theories of aiding and
abetting liability to secure compensation for harm and promote deterrence of
future attacks. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685
( 7 th Cir. 2008) (recognizing aiding and abetting liability). The author was cocounsel for amicus curiae Families of September 11 Victims in Boim.
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government muscle to maintain abusive labor practices. In
other cases, however, a corporation may simply be doing
business in a generic manner, without affirmatively
colluding with the regime. Liability in the latter case can
have unintended consequences.
A legal standard that dictated liability in the second
situation may harm others, such as Muslim Americans who
have unwittingly contributed to groups that the government
later claims are allied with terrorist organizations. 241 Where
an individual has knowingly provided assistance to a group
such as Hamas with an ongoing commitment to violence,
such liability is appropriate. However, an expansive
standard could trigger liability, even where there was no
evidence that defendants aided terrorist acts, their
assistance was de minimis, and the contribution was remote
in time from the harm alleged.
Crossover advocacy may also boomerang by unduly
limiting the options of future presidents who seek to achieve
goals rightly praised by progressives. A future president
may wish to intervene to stop genocide in the Sudan or
elsewhere. 242 However, even given that some curbs on the
president are necessary and desirable, an unduly rigid
regime could preclude such action.243 Arguments used
against the president in one administration are then
available for use against another president with very
different goals: John Yoo was a vigorous critic of President
Clinton's participation in the NATO intervention in Kosovo,
pronouncing it a product of presidential fiat. 244 Similarly,
241. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the
Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable
Organizations, and Global Philanthropy,45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004)
(discussing policy consequences of antiterror legislation).
242. See James Rainey, Time to Make Candidates Answer on Iraq, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 2008, at A21 (describing views of Senator Obama and
Democrats).
243. See Margulies, supranote 26 (analyzing separation of powers in context
of intervention to stop genocide).
244. Admittedly, Yoo's critique is an idiosyncratic hybrid of his enthusiasm
for presidential power and his disdain for international institutions. According
to Yoo, President Clinton could have intervened in Kosovo under virtually any
circumstances except those that reflected his view that placing American troops
within NATO's multinational command was the most effective path for military
action. John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1673, 1709-14 (2000).
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while the Bush administration's missteps have highlighted
the importance of transparency, sometimes secrecy is
crucial in national security legal advice. 245 President Obama
has continued the practice of the Bush administration in
authorizing military strikes in Pakistan.246 A president
deciding on such a course might wish to obtain a legal
opinion supporting the legality of such a move, which would
ordinarily trigger concern about the use of unjustified force
against a sovereign state, compliance with the War Powers
Resolution, or the limits of presidential power. The
necessity to disclose such legal advice would, needless to
say, compromise the mission and preclude achievement of
the objective.247 While advocates should guard against
government overreaching, they should also recognize that a
fresh attack on the United States would grant new purchase
to discredited Bush administration policies.
Crossover advocates' targeting of Yoo and other
administration officials also threatens political polarization,
of the kind that was routine during the era of the
Independent Counsel statute. 248 Prosecuting senior officials
for war crimes might trigger prosecutions of political
officials of the other party in a subsequent administration.
The imperatives of partisan payback might squeeze out any
hope of bipartisan problem-solving.
A legal regime dominated by payback could also be
more volatile and less transparent. Officials concerned
about legal exposure might freeze out agencies like the
Office of Legal Counsel that leave a paper trail.249 Officials
245. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality
Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033 (2007) (analyzing issues).
246. Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will
Continue, CIA Chief Says; Panetta Call Strikes 'Successful' at Disrupting
Insurgents,WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2009, at A10.
247. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and
Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679-81
(2003); cf. Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, supra note 246.
248. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 589-94 (2005).
249. The potential for freeze-out is a weakness of proposals to make the
Office of Legal Counsel a free-standing quasi-judicial entity. See Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336-40 (2006) (advancing proposal);
cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
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might also engage in more satellite crimes such as
obstruction and perjury to cover up wrongdoing. At the
same time, reduced access to legal advice might encourage
inappropriately aggressive policy initiatives. The net result
could be more recklessness accompanied by less disclosure.
B. The Adversary's Exit
Crossover advocacy is also ineffective when advocates
fail to recognize that officials subjected to heightened
constraints in one realm can resume their activities
elsewhere. Ronald Coase observed this phenomenon decades
ago, when he noted that parties inhibited by legal rules
could contract their way around the rules, as long as
transaction costs were low. 250 More recently, attempts to
make institutions such as psychiatric hospitals more
humane have encountered unforeseen complications, as
governments reacted by dumping patients on the streets or
populations to other settings, such as
shifting institutional
251
jails and prisons.
Exit is a pervasive but often overlooked concern in the
war on terror. For example, shutting down Guantanamo
means little if the government is able to move future
detainees to Bagram Air Base, the island of Diego Garcia, or
252
other sites where accountability is more elusive.
Professional or liability rules that forbid psychologists from
participating in any interrogations of war on terror
detainees lose significance if the government can use inhouse interrogators who have fewer scruples and no
commitment to transparency. 253 If state legal ethics
regulators became unduly intrusive in seeking to discipline
errant federal government lawyers, the federal government
might ultimately set up its own licensure provisions and

865, 896-909 (2007) (criticizing Katyal's suggestion, while acknowledging
importance of other less formal methods for ensuring deliberation within
executive branch).
250. Jolls, supra note 8, at 4-5.
251. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudenceand Public
Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 487, 515 (1999).
252. See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 59 (2006).

253. See Carey, supra note 85.
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have its lawyers opt out of state systems, as the Supremacy
Clause would most likely allow the government to do.254
C. Backlash
Crossover advocacy involving international or foreign
forums can also spark mobilization for opposing forces with
greater power. Advocacy fails if addressing one problem
creates an even more formidable obstacle. Unfortunately,
here, as elsewhere, the temporal discounting deficit plays a
substantial role, encouraging advocates to overweigh
immediate success and underestimate the consequences of
backlash.
To illustrate how a predictable response by the political
branches can make matters worse for those similarly
situated to clients, consider the 1990s Haitian HIV
litigation involving Guantanamo. In part because the
lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) and the Yale Human Rights Clinic raised the profile
of Haitian refugees and immigrants with HIV, the political
branches took two momentous steps. First, Congress
expressly wrote into the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) an exclusion for people with HIV.255 Second, the
executive branch expanded its policy of interdicting vessels
carrying Haitians on the high seas, and summarily
returning passengers to Haiti. 256 Although precursors to
these policies had been in place at the beginning of the
lawsuit, action by Congress and the president made the
policies far more pervasive.257 The publicity generated by
254. See Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors
and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 515 (1992) (warning that state ethics regulation can unduly chill
prosecutors, or even prompt federal exit from realm of state professional
regulation).
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006). A waiver is available for this
provision, but the waiver is limited in its reach. § 1182(g)(1) (providing for
waiver for close relatives of United States citizens or lawful permanent
residents); see also April Thompson, The Immigration HIV Exclusion: An
Ineffective Means for Promoting Public Health in a Global Age, 5 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 145, 155-58 (2005).
256. The Supreme Court upheld the interdiction policy in Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
257. The HIV immigration exclusion, for example, had been regulatory, not
statutory, before the lawsuit. It had also been in relative desuetude, without
provisions for automatic HIV testing, which the government started after
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the lawyers in the case helped to free the detainees, but also
galvanized an adverse political response with significant
long-term adverse effects for prospective immigrants with
HIV and refugees. Unfortunately, the self-serving bias
impeded advocates' ability to appreciate that their own wellintentioned efforts had contributed to these adverse
consequences. As another example, consider recent efforts
by CCR to initiate legal proceedings against former Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld and others through the invocation of
universal jurisdiction in France and Germany. 258 The
argument for such efforts is that they create accountability
for senior officials who made decisions that violated rights
and hurt America's reputation. The downside of such
efforts, however, is that they have a counter-productive
effect on mobilization domestically. An effective transition
from the monolithic approach of the post-9/11 period
requires a consensus between different political factions.
Recourse to universal jurisdiction will not further a
consensus of this kind. Indeed, recourse to universal
jurisdiction and international forums too often discounts the
importance of domestic political participation. Federalism,
for example, is a powerful political force domestically that
also carries weight in the American legal system, but
259
receives far less recognition in international forums.
Congress enacted the statutory exclusion. See Thompson, supra note 255, at
155-58.
258. See Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 63; cf. Diane F.
Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdictionwith Democratic
Principles,92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1107-08 (2004) (arguing for democratic legitimacy
of universal jurisdiction, but acknowledging difficulties caused, inter alia, by
lack of accountability of nongovernmental organizations).
259. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). But see Ingrid Brunk
Wuerth, InternationalLaw and ConstitutionalInterpretation:The Commander
in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 73-82 (2007) (arguing for
more robust role for international law in informing judicial decisions and
constraining political branches). See generally John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin,
Should InternationalLaw Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226-28
(2007) (arguing that canon requiring that courts construe statutes to avoid
violations of international law imports norms with less legitimacy and
guarantees of "quality" than decisions by president). In general, I would favor a
more robust rule for international law than the limited view outlined by
McGinnis. My concern here is largely with the practical and political
consequences of recourse to international forums when courts permit Congress
and (to a lesser degree) the states to act contrary to international law. See
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (holding that Congress is free under
"last-in-time" rule to modify United States obligations under international law,
as it could modify effect of previously enacted statute); cf. William S. Dodge,
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Using these forums to try Americans will not encourage
political participation aimed at a progressive consensus;
indeed, such measures will encourage a domestic political
backlash. Asserting universal jurisdiction in foreign
tribunals will often set up an "us versus them" dialectic that
will discredit forces for change at home. 260 It may also
encourage officials to stay in power, rather than retire
gracefully, thus making for more volatile legal and political
processes and rockier transitions.261
Finally, crossover advocates seeking accountability for
United States officials from another sovereign's tribunals
may underestimate the ability and inclination of Congress
to reject international obligations. 262 Congress has this
power under the last-in-time rule. 263 Legislative measures
would create grave obstacles to adjudication in foreign
tribunals.264 Even more seriously, a political backlash could
target international law remedies currently available in
American courts.265 Unfortunately, even the most able
Customary InternationalLaw and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARv. L. REV.
19, 25-27 (2007) (discussing doctrine).
Advocates' disdain for federalism concerns may also trigger greater
recognition of federalism in international forums, which may erect barriers for
litigants to minimize the need to impose otherwise intrusive relief on states. See
Starr, supra note 11. This may be a positive trend for the development of
international law. However, from the crossover advocate's perspective,
international forums' recognition of federalism is yet another boomerang effect.
See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811 (ICSID 2003)
(holding that Canadian corporate defendant seeking remedy in international
trade tribunal for American state court jury verdict that appeared to violate
international law was required to exhaust remedies within United States legal
system).
260. Cf. Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008,
Magazine at 32 (leading theorist of psychology of language asserts that most
people seem to view as "repugnant" the act of saying "something bad about your
nation (which you don't believe) . .. in a foreign nation"). While sincerity in the
speaker may ease this repugnance, it may not eliminate a negative reaction.
261. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
133-36 (2007); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79
N.Y.U. L, REV. 1971, 2015 (2004) (discussing risks to democracy posed by undue
reliance on international forums and norms).
262. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
263. See id. at 194.
264. For example, action by Congress could frustrate investigation,
discovery, and compulsory process to procure witness' testimony at trial.
265. These include remedies under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) that have
provided accountability for human rights violators around the globe. The
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crossover advocates sometimes fail to appreciate that
mobilization is a two-way street: advocates who sharpen
their mobilization game inspire adversaries to do the
same.

266

VI. MAKING SENSE OF CROSSOVER
ADVOCACY: TOWARD A MOBILIZATION METRIC

The discussion of crossover advocacy's virtues and vices
demonstrates that this brand of advocacy is both promising
and perilous. At its best, crossover advocacy enhances the
voices of clients and seizes the initiative from overreaching
government officials. In displaying these attributes, it
compensates for the diminution in access to court that often
accompanies national security crises such as September 11.
However, the advocate's migration from the judicial realm
to the eclectic world of crossover forums can also reduce
lawyer accountability, foment conflicts of interest and role,
and unleash a hail of adverse externalities. This section
suggests a mobilization metric to better govern the lawyer's
tactical choices.
A. General Principles
As a prelude to presenting this metric, I advance three
premises:
first,
the
foreseeable
consequences
of
mobilization, including the responses of adversaries and
third parties, are endogenous to the decisions of crossover
advocates. Second, crossover advocates are prone to error in
possibility of backlash is one concern about the litigation in Corrie v.
Caterpillar,Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007), where the plaintiffs sought to
impose liability on a corporation that sold earth-moving machinery to the U.S.
government for shipment to Israel. While some of the machinery was apparently
used in the course of destroying the homes of suspected Palestinian terrorists,
much of it presumably was used for a wide range of uncontroversial construction
projects. Liability under the ATS should hinge on a more active partnership
between the defendant and a government pursuing unjust policies. If the court
had not dismissed the lawsuit on procedural grounds, Congress would have been
forced to act to preserve the political branches' control over the content of aid
packages to other nations-a core foreign policy concern.
266. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 129 (describing the indignation of
long-time CCR director Michael Ratner upon learning that advocates' efforts to
regulate asylum procedures for Haitians detained at Guantanamo in the early
1990s had led to policy of interdicting refugees at sea and repatriating them, an
action the Supreme Court upheld in Sale v. HaitianCtrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155 (1993)).
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assessing those consequences because of asymmetric
accountability and the temporal discounting deficit. Third,
to cope with the risk of error, the crossover advocate's
tactics must continually evolve, allowing the advocate to
exploit new opportunities. The next subsection explores
these premises in greater depth. The following subsection
advances a mobilization metric to help ensure advocates'
fidelity to the premises stated.
1. Lawyers and the Endogenous Consequences of
Mobilization. The lawyer embarking on mobilization must
consider all of the potential consequences, both intended
and unintended. To facilitate such deliberation, the
advocate should analyze ex ante how a lawyer's move aligns
incentives for adversaries.
When externalities like boomerang effects, exit, and
backlash are foreseeable, the crossover advocate must tailor
her decisions accordingly. For example, the advocate
pressing for the closure of Guantanamo should have a Plan
B if the government seeks to place more suspected terrorists
in the custody of foreign governments that are less
accessible to United States justice and public opinion. The
crossover advocate must also appreciate that her efforts at
mobilization may crystallize opposition, as occurred with
the HIV exclusion and the government's interdiction policy
in reaction to the Haitian refugee concerning Guantanamo
litigation in the early 1990s. While the advocate does not
bear sole responsibility for such adverse developments, she
cannot afford to view the government's
responses as
267
exogenous to her strategic decisions.
2. The Ubiquity of Cognitive Bias. Once the lawyer
accepts responsibility for consequences, she must still
neutralize the cognitive errors that plague deliberation.
Countering the temporal discounting deficit should head the
crossover advocate's internal agenda. In court, the
constellation of rules acts as a backstop for the advocate.
267. This does not mean that the lawyer's default position should be relying
on traditional advocacy or doing nothing. Obviously, these choices have
opportunity costs, as well. However, the lawyer should strive to identify net
costs from each course of action. Cf. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence
Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the InterdisciplinaryTurn, 47 B.C. L. REV.
949, 992 (2006) (discussing Bayes's Theorem and assessments of probability for
different scenarios).
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Because of asymmetrical accountability mechanisms, the
crossover advocate is on her own. However, the lack of rules
in crossover venues may tempt the advocate to emulate
Icarus, flying too high without recognizing that a hard
landing is closer than it appears. Consider here how Clive
Stafford Smith seized the chance to critique conditions at
Guantanamo by telling a reporter that his client would do
anything for release, including pleading guilty to being the
pope. 268 Only later-if at all-did Smith appreciate that his
attempt at sarcasm may have prejudiced his client's efforts
for a plea bargain. A commitment to ferreting out short- and
long-term consequences is one corrective for the crossover
advocate's susceptibility to cognitive miscues.
3. Crossover Lawyering and Coping with Transitions.A
lawyer who corrects for cognitive miscues is also better
situated to consider the need for evolving tactics that exploit
transitions. At strategic pivot points, once-successful tactics
yield diminishing returns. Nevertheless, opportunities arise
to consolidate gains or hedge against further deterioration
in a legal position. For example, in the Haitian
Guantanamo litigation, while many of the Yale law
students were focusing on rarefied legal arguments, Michael
Ratner and student Michael Wishnie hammered out
agreements with the government regarding re-settlement of
pregnant and severely ill detainees in the United States.269
This work was far from glamorous, but it helped clients in
severe need receive the treatment and services they
required. Recognizing these pivot points is crucial, since
opportunities are elusive and attention spent on modes of
advocacy that have outlived their usefulness generates
opportunity costs for clients.
B. The MobilizationMetric
Honoring the above principles is easier with a model or
symbolic terminology that isolates variables the lawyer
should consider.270 I call the formula advanced in this
268. Bonner, supra note 88.
269. See GOLDSTEIN, supranote 46, at 172-75.
270. For other examples of modeling on lawyering and related issues, see
Peter Tillers, Webs of Things in the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1989) (reviewing DAVID SCHuM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE
FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST (1987)) (discussing Bayesian probability theory
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subsection a mobilization metric. The metric seeks to
overcome cognitive biases such as the temporal discounting
deficit, honing lawyers' choices about the rewards and risks
of crossover advocacy. There is a great deal of play in the
joints in these calculations. Nevertheless, focusing on the
values of these variables and how they interact helps to
guide deliberation about phenomena that the crossover
advocate must address.
1. Crossover Variables and the Mobilization Metric. The
mobilization metric considered covers the entire range of
the crossover advocacy repertoire. It includes advocacy in
the media and in international forums. It also encompasses
lawsuits that function as cogs in broader campaigns such as

the lawsuit against Caterpillar,

Inc.271

and actions seeking

damages for extraordinary rendition. 272 In addition, it covers
efforts to assert universal jurisdiction in the courts of other
sovereign nations, such as CCR's attempts to initiate
proceedings in Germany and France against Donald
Rumsfeld.
One side of the formula considers three factors: first,
the probability of the innocence of the detainee (P); second,
the treatment of the detainee, including both subjection to
physical coercion and the risk of unfair procedures (T); and,
third, the gravity of the maximum sentence that could be
imposed or other harm to the client (G). The other side of
the formula considers the opportunity value (0) of

and evidence law, author describes numbers and symbols as "special kind of
grammar or language" aimed at enhancing understanding and analysis of
problems, but not requiring quantitative approach to validate this language). Cf.
Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic
Efficiency, and the PreliminaryInjunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005)
(modeling approach to remedies); Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The
Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An InstitutionalAccount of American Tort
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1599-1602 (2004) (critiquing formula's assumption).
But see Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law
of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1507-08 (2001) (expressing skepticism about
use of Bayes's Theorem as a technique for evaluating the reliability of evidence,
based on the subjective calculations inherent in application of the theorem);
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
271. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
272. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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mobilization 273 and 274
the ease of an adversary's exit (E) from
attempted reforms.
Under the mobilization metric, crossover advocacy is
appropriate where P(T + G) > 0 + E.
2. The Mobilization Metric in Practice. Like advocacy
strategies, formulas can appear deceptively plausible in the
abstract. However, implementing the formula is the only
reliable test of its usefulness. I apply the mobilization
metric to several examples in the following subsections.
a. Opportunity Costs and Omar Khadr's Case. To see
how the metric plays out, consider the case of Omar Khadr.
Let us assume that Khadr, who was apprehended in battle
by United States forces, is not a false positive-a relief
worker or journalist who was merely in the wrong place at
the wrong time. We'll stipulate to a P value of .5 for Khadr.
Let's assign T a value of 1, since Khadr may not have faced
treatment as outrageous as other detainees, and one court
declined to find that he had been abused,275 but evidence
suggests that his treatment was clearly poor at some point
and the procedures in place pre-Hamdan for adjudicating
his case before the military commission were unfair. Let's
assign G a value of 2, at least as of the time that Khadr
faced the death penalty. At that juncture, our calculus for
the left side of the formula would be .5(1 + 2) = 1.5.
On the other side of the equation, we have an 0 value of
1, for efforts in international forums that might distract the
273. Opportunity costs can include an adversary's diminished willingness to
negotiate when the advocate fails to practice candor, as well as boomerang
effects, such as the possibility that unconstrained standards of aiding and
abetting liability applied to human rights violators will adversely affect
international charitable organizations that must operate in countries controlled
by despotic governments. However, 0 can also include a gain in opportunities to
further the advocate's cause, such as opportunities to refine the advocacy
organization's expertise and signal its long-term commitment to addressing a
problem. For purposes of the metric, O's valuation in this latter case would be
negative. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
274. Exit would include the government's use of foreign nations to detain
suspected terrorists if Guantanamo were closed, or United States diplomatic or
litigation efforts to scuttle other nations' assertion of universal jurisdiction. Exit
would also encompass action by the Congress to modify United States
compliance with international law under the last in time rule or amend statutes
such as the Alien Tort Statute that provide a remedy for human rights
violations.
275. O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005).
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advocate from more promising traditional tactics, including
proffers of cooperation and expressions of remorse. 276 E
would be zero, since the government's only exit here would
be returning Khadr to Canada, which would make him
better off.277 If the lawyer avoided conspiracy theories but
advocated for her client in international forums, as Khadr's
first lawyers did, then the metric would yield the following
result: .5(1 + 2) [1.51 > 1. Under the metric, crossover
forums would be
advocacy involving international
appropriate. Indeed such advocacy was successful, at least
in taking the death penalty off the table.
To see how a mobilization metric indicates a pivot point
when circumstances change, consider the revised situation
in Khadr's case after the death penalty was out of the
picture. Here, P is still .5. T is still 1. However, with the
removal of the death penalty from the equation, now G is
also 1. Under our rubric, .5(1 + 1) = 1. Here, the lawyer
must also consider the opportunity cost (0 = 1) of placing all
her eggs in the basket of international advocacy, and
neglecting the cooperation option. At this juncture, since
.5(1 + 1) [1] = 1, P(T + G) is not greater than 0 + E. The
lawyer should be prepared to give her client the bad news
that the international law forums have outlived their
usefulness, unless the client sweetens the deal with a
proffer of cooperation.
b. Suing Yoo. As another illustration of how the metric
works, consider the Yale Project's representation of Jose
Padilla in his lawsuit against John Yoo. P would reflect that
Padilla had been convicted of terrorism charges in federal
court at the time of the lawsuit's filing, but that the
conviction was based on attending a terrorist training camp,
not on seeking to build a radiation-filled (or "dirty") bomb,
as the government claimed when it first detained Padilla.
This would put P at .5, the halfway point between clear
276. The 0 value would be 2 for more aggressive tactics, such as the
unsupported accusations of a conspiracy to kill civilians made by Khadr's
current lawyer William Kuebler. These accusations could generate ill will in the
tribunal, and could even pave the way for the advocate's replacement.
277. In cases where detainees fear torture or persecution in their native
countries if the United States tires of detaining them at Guantanamo, advocates
must argue for the government's compliance with international obligations such
as those under the Convention against Torture, see CAT, supra note 220, or
must seek an injunction against their repatriation pending resolution of their
habeas claim. See, e.g., Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 458-59 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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guilt on the original charges (P = 0) and innocence (P = 1).
The government had subjected Padilla to unfair procedures
by asserting the unreviewable authority to detain him, so T
= 1. However, Padilla was no longer being detained as an
enemy combatant, and his sentence was 15 years-far less
than the life sentence possible under federal law, which the
government had requested. In light of these trade-offs, G =
.5. To fill in the left side of the formula, .5(1 + .5) = .75.
In contrast, opportunity and exit costs for the Padilla
lawsuit are significant. Because the Yale Project lawyers
had to resort to weasel words like "fostered" to describe the
Bybee Memo's role, their pleadings lacked the concreteness
that courts require. The result of attempting to use the
courts without this predicate of concreteness is either public
indifference or backlash. In light of these concerns, 0 = 1.
Exit costs of the lawsuit against Yoo also affect the right
side of the ledger. Liability of a government legal adviser
could have a chilling effect, deterring not merely
irresponsible advice but capable counsel on sensitive
278
matters such as targeted killings of Al-Qaeda higher-ups.
Concern over liability could also lead future policymakers to
simply by-pass the Office of Legal Counsel, concentrating
advice functions in the White House where lawyers have
even less independence. In light of these concerns, E = 1, for
a total of 2 on the right side. 279 Since .75 < 2, mobilization of
this kind is inappropriate. Rather than resorting to
litigation, advocates should turn to other forums such as
congressional hearings to push for more careful tailoring of
executive branch action and greater transparency for legal
opinions justifying executive authority.
c. Mobilizing Against Rendition. One would reach a
different result, however, in the case of damage suits on
behalf of victims of extraordinary rendition such as Maher
Arar. Here, Arar was demonstrably innocent, as we can
278. See supranotes 243-48 and accompanying text.
279. One could argue that this harm is an externality that harms the public
interest, not the client. However, the lawyer may consider the public interest in
her deliberations on tactics. See Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me
That?'" Attorney-Client DeliberationRegarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests
of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990); Zacharias & Green, supra note 189; cf.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 2.1 (2009) (recommending that lawyer
provide client with advice on a range of concerns, including social, moral, and
political factors).
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surmise from Secretary of State's admission that mistakes
were made. 280 So P = 1. Arar was subject to unfair
procedures throughout his ordeal, including interference
with his right to counsel, a summary removal hearing, and
the United States' acceptance of assurances from Syria, a
country that the State Department has labeled a serial
human rights violator. So T = 1, as well. At the same time,
the torture that Arar was subject to in Syria was
horrendous, so G = 1. On the left side of the formula, 1(1 +
1) = 2.
On the right side of the formula, the risk of exit is
negligible. If advocates can persuade the United States
government to think twice before engaging in extraordinary
rendition, the government will have to detain and
interrogate suspected terrorists through avenues that yield
greater accountability.28 1 So E = zero. 282 Moreover,
opportunity costs here are negative. Litigation complements
other efforts to ensure accountability, such as congressional
hearings. Indeed, Secretary of State Rice's statement of
regret for the episode occurred only after judicial and
legislative hearings triggered by the Arar lawsuit. The only
chilling effect possible is a greater reluctance to seek or
believe assurances from serious human rights violators,
such as Syria. Because this result makes all detainees
better off and because of the strong synergies between
litigation and political efforts here, 0 = -2. So the right side
of the equation is 0 + -2 = -2. Since 2 > -2, pursuing the
lawsuit is an appropriate crossover tactic, whatever the
plaintiffs chances of actually prevailing in a judicial forum.

280. Scott Shane, On Torture, 2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A18 (noting that the Secretary of State told a House
hearing that the government had "mishandled" the Arar case).
281. Such choices would include detention in the United States, a post-

Boumediene Guantanamo with heightened access to federal court, or a
detainee's country of origin where friends and family can exert more leverage on
the detainee's behalf.
282. Yale's National Litigation Project therefore acted appropriately in filing

a lawsuit against a company that had allegedly been complicit in the rendition
of a Guantanamo detainee. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing lawsuit on state secrets grounds).

The same analysis would apply to cases brought in foreign courts seeking
evidence that a detainee had been subjected to coercion. See Mohamed v. Sec'y
of State, (2008) EWHC (Q.B.) 2048 (Eng.).
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d. The Metric and Advocacy Strategy. The metric's
highlighting of exit effects suggests that mobilization
campaigns must be selective. For example, attempts to
exercise universal jurisdiction over administration officials
in foreign tribunals fail to address the counter-mobilization
problem. Opposition to universal jurisdiction could prompt
exit by the political branches, expressed in diplomatic and
legislative efforts to narrow remedies. However, political
pressure for repeal or amendment of legislation like the
Military Commissions Act that curbs remedies under
international law is clearly appropriate.23 In addition,
advocates should press for reform of rules like the state
secrets doctrine, 2 4 which allows the government to withhold
information and sometimes obtain dismissal of a lawsuit
challenging alleged overreaching. Political mobilization to
achieve these goals will make exit from accountability more
difficult for the government, and lower the opportunity costs
of advocacy.
CONCLUSION

Concern about the human rights consequences of the
war on terror has underlined the need for crossover tactics.
The mobilization that crossover advocacy seeks to promote
is not new; indeed, it dates back at least to the lawyering of
John Adams and Josiah Quincy in the colonial era. In each
generation since then, lawyers have responded to limits on
legal remedies with mobilization efforts outside of
traditional venues. The plight of detainees is but the latest
occasion.
Crossover advocacy illustrates a dynamic that occurs in
every fluid regulatory regime. Coase theorized decades ago
that parties subject to legal standards they found to be
inefficient would contract out of those standards. Similarly,
283. See Peter Margulies, The Military Commissions Act, Coerced
Confessions, and the Role of the Courts, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2 (2006); cf.
Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law" and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 760, 765-70 (2007) (analyzing role of courts in reviewing military
commission procedures and rulings); David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the
Military Commissions Act: On Striking the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT'L L.
344, 354-62 (2007) (recommending a prudential approach that where possible
interprets the Military Commissions Act in light of principles of constitutional
and international law).
284. See Chesney, supranote 60.
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when legislatures enact tort reform measures that limit
certain kinds of damages, a crossover effect occurs in which
juries award more money in the categories of damages that
the legislature has not regulated.
However, the crossover phenomenon is not always
costless. Lawyers in a tort reform jurisdiction turn down
cases that lack provable pecuniary damages. When the state
regulates crack cocaine more strictly, scholars have
surmised that traffickers turn to heroin. If international
forums require complete relief for a victim of human rights
violations, these same forums may hedge their bets by
erecting procedural obstacles to prosecution of a claim.
Crossover advocacy manifests analogous strengths and
weaknesses.
The virtues of crossover advocacy are clear. In a range
of venues, including media interaction, advocacy with
foreign governments, damage suits, and appearances in
international forums, advocates can amplify the voices of
detainee clients and build more effective advocacy
institutions. Crossover advocacy can also enhance the
integrity and transparency of legal regimes affecting
detainees, and clients' negotiating posture. However,
crossover advocates are also susceptible to pervasive
cognitive flaws, such as the temporal discounting deficit,
which leads to an underweighting of long-term costs, and
self-serving bias, which impedes advocates' insight about
their own responsibility for adverse impacts of their
mobilization campaigns.
These cognitive flaws create three classes of adverse
crossover effects. First, clients suffer opportunity costs when
the asymmetric accountability of crossover venues prompts
lawyers to overinvest in certain mobilization strategies. For
example, the media's quest for novelty and cultivation of ex
parte contacts tempts lawyers to sacrifice candor and
judgment in spinning stories of detainee innocence and
abuse. Second, crossover advocates experience conflicts of
interest and role. For example, the Yale Project's lawsuit
against John Yoo abandoned the virtues of concreteness and
consistency in its pursuit of payback for Yoo's poor legal
advice on interrogation methods. Third, crossover advocacy
can cause negative externalities, including boomerang
effects that injure advocates' causes and allies, government
exit into less transparent domains, and backlash that limits
remedies. For example, advocates pressing for the closure of
Guantanamo fail to consider that this step may increase use
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of even less transparent methods such as extraordinary
rendition of terrorism suspects.
It is tempting to attribute these risks of crossover
advocacy to the excesses of the Bush administration. If
administration officials had taken care from the beginning
to comply with domestic and international law on the
detention, interrogation, and trial of suspected terrorists,
lawyers would have been able to go to court, instead of
being obliged to seek alternative forums. On this view, the
missteps of crossover advocates have the same origin as a
long line of assaults on lawyers' integrity launched by the
administration since September 11, including the skewed
advice in the torture memos, the firing of United States
Attorneys, and the use of political litmus tests for civil
service positions.
While this perspective is tempting, it is in the final
analysis irrelevant. Crossover lawyering never surfaces in a
perfect legal system. It invariably emerges as a response to
real or perceived government excesses, from the Boston
Massacre to the present. The task for lawyers is to mobilize
the forces of change without ceding the initiative to
adversaries.
The mobilization metric aims to ease the crossover
advocate's dilemma. It begins with three premises:
advocates'
responsibility
for changes
wrought
by
mobilization efforts, the ubiquity of cognitive biases, and the
importance of pivoting to new tactics to cope with legal
transitions. Building on these premises, the mobilization
metric integrates variables such as opportunity costs and
the adversary's ease of exit. By refining the quality of
deliberation, the metric reduces adverse crossover effects
and helps ensure maximum gains for both clients and the
public interest.

